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NOTES AND COMMENTS
A GOOD RESULT DOES NOT JUSTIFY IMPROPER
MEANS: A STRICT SCRUTINY OF METRO
BROADCASTING, INC. v. FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
I. INTRODUCTION
In a perfect world, the consideration of one's race or gender would
never be the determinant factor in allocating important benefits.'
Rather, talent and individual merit would determine one's fate.2 Unfor-
tunately, we do not live in a perfect world, because the lasting effects of
discrimination continue to play a dominant role in America.' Although
the Fourteenth Amendment declares that "[n]o State shall ... deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,"4 clas-
sifications based on race must be adopted in order to combat the effects
of racial discrimination. While racial classifications raise suspicions be-
cause historically they were used to deny equality, serious progress re-
quires the use of race-based programs that benefit minorities.5 In recent
1. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union, The New York City Com-
mission on Human Rights, and The NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund in Support of
Petitioner in No. 89-700 and in Support of Respondents in No. 89-453 at 6, Astroline Commu-
nications Co. v. Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990) (No. 89-700);
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990) (No. 89-453). See, e.g., Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984); Mississippi Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982). But see Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
2. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union, The New York City Com-
mission on Human Rights, and The NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund in Support of
Petitioner in No. 89-700 and in Support of Respondents in No. 89-453 at 6-7, Astroline Com-
munications Co. v. Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990) (No. 89-
700); Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990) (No. 89-453).
3. Margaret E. Deane, Note, City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.: A Federal Legislative
Answer. 100 YALE L.J. 451, 455 (1990); Donald E. Lively & Stephen Plass, Equal Protection.:
The Jurisprudence of Denial and Evasion, 40 AM. U.L. Rnv. 1307, 1309 (1991). See Charles
R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism
39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 322 (1987) ("Americans share a common historical and cultural heri-
tage in which racism has played and still plays a dominant role.").
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
5. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGH'S SERIOUSLY 239 (1978). See also T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1060, 1062 (1991) ("[I]n order
to make progress in ending racial oppression and racism, our political and moral discourse
must move from colorblindness to colorconsciousness, from antidiscrimination to racial
justice.").
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years, however, the Supreme Court has disregarded the inequalities mi-
norities face and invalidated many of these affirmative action programs.
6
In Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission
("Metro Broadcasting"),7 the Court finally appeared to breathe new life
into affirmative action,' when it upheld two programs that gave minori-
ties preference in obtaining radio and television licenses.9 Upon closer
scrutiny, however, Metro Broadcasting does not demonstrate the
Supreme Court's commitment to affirmative action. Instead, it merely
contributes to the constitutional quagmire' ° existing in the affirmative
action area." By ignoring precedent 2 and by failing to establish a test
for "benign" discrimination,' 3 the Court ensures a perilous future for af-
firmative action programs.
In Metro Broadcasting, the Court held that "benign race-conscious
6. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Wygant v. Jack-
son Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978).
7. 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990).
8. Affirmative action is defined as "employment programs required by federal statutes
and regulations designed to remedy discriminatory practices in hiring minority group mem-
bers; Ze. designed to eliminate existing and continuing discrimination, to remedy lingering
effects of past discrimination, and to create systems and procedures to prevent future discrimi-
nation .. " BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 55 (5th ed. 1979). See National Labor Relations
Bd. v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 257 (1939); National Labor Relations Bd. v.
Leviton Mfg. Co., 111 F.2d 619, 621 (2d Cir. 1940). Comprehensively defined, "affirmative
action" includes a variety of activities aimed at "overcom[ing] the effects of past or present
practices, policies, or other barriers to equal employment." EEOC Guidelines, Affirmative
Action Appropriate Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 As Amended, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1608.1(c) (1990).
9. 110 S. Ct. at 3008-09.
10. "Metro [Broadcasting] leaves the constitutional future of affirmative action as murky as
ever ...." Michel Rosenfeld, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Affirmative Action at the
Crossroads of Constitutional Liberty and Equality, 38 UCLA L. REV. 583, 583 (1991).
11. Prior to Metro Broadcasting, the Supreme Court contended with government-spon-
sored racially based programs four different times. In these four cases-City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), Wygant v. Jackson Board of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986),
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), and Regents of the Univ. of Cal v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265 (1978), the twenty-three opinions generated by the Justices evidences the confusion of the
constitutional issues. See infra text accompanying notes 145-195. See also Jesse H. Choper,
Continued Uncertainty as to the Constitutionality of Remedial Racial Classifications." Identify-
ing the Pieces of the Puzzle, 72 IOWA L. REV. 255, 255 (concluding "that an enormous degree
of ambiguity and uncertainty persists [in the affirmative action area]").
12. "The Supreme Court's decision in Metro [Broadcasting] seems difficult to reconcile
with previous decisions upholding affirmative action." Michel Rosenfeld, Metro Broadcasting,
Inc. v. FCC: Affirmative Action at the Crossroads of Constitutional Liberty and Equality, 38
UCLA L. REV. 583, 587 (1991).
13. Benign discrimination has been described as "the use of racial classifications to benefit
rather than burden particular racial or ethnic minorities." JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW 661 (2d ed. 1983).
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measures mandated by Congress" can be subjected to the standard of
intermediate scrutiny, which requires a program to be substantially re-
lated to an important governmental interest. 4 Although the application
of this standard provided the correct result in Metro Broadcasting, this
standard is clearly incongruous with prior decisions. It explicitly contra-
dicts the Supreme Court opinion in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.
("Croson"), " which held that all racial classifications should be subjected
to strict scrutiny.I6  Strict scrutiny is more stringent than intermediate
scrutiny and requires: (1) a compelling, rather than an important, gov-
ernmental interest; and (2) the ends to be necessary and narrowly tailored,
rather than substantially related, to the achievement of that interest.
17
14. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3008-09. "[B]enign race-conscious measures man-
dated by Congress... are constitutionally permissible to the extent that they serve important
governmental objectives within the power of Congress and are substantially related to achieve-
ment of those objectives." Id.
15. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
16. The Court concluded that "the standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause
is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular classification." Id.
at 494 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White and Kennedy, JJ.).
[Tihere is simply no way of determining what classifications are 'benign' or 'reme-
dial' and what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial
inferiority or simple racial politics. Indeed, the purpose of strict scrutiny is to 'smoke
out' illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal
important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool. The test also ensures that
the means chosen 'fit' this compelling goal so closely that there is little or no possibil-
ity that the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial prejudice or
stereotype.
Id. at 493.
17. Courts have used three standards of review in deciding equal protection challenges to
governmental actions. Each standard consists of a two-prong test with an ends and means
requirement. The first prong evaluates the ends, purposes, objectives and interests the pro-
gram purports to serve. Roy L. Brooks, The Affirmative Action Issue: Law, Policy and Moral-
ity, 22 CONN. L. REV. 323, 338 (1990). The second prong scrutinizes whether the program
best achieves the ends. Id The three standards of review are strict scrutiny, intermediate
scrutiny, and rational basis.
Classifications based on race are subject to heightened scrutiny, either intermediate scru-
tiny or strict scrutiny. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 496 (1986). The
strict scrutiny test requires Justices to independently determine the degree that the classifica-
tion bears to the end. JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 591-92 (2d ed. 1983).
The government must show that it is pursuing a "compelling" or "overriding" end and that
the classification is necessary to promote that compelling interest. Id.
The second standard of review, intermediate scrutiny, was never used by a majority of the
Supreme Court in racial equal protection claims until Metro Broadcasting. In Regents of the
Univ. of CaL v. Bakke, four of the five-member majority favored an intermediate level of scru-
tiny. 438 U.S. 265, 359 (1978) (opinion of Brennan, J., joined by White, Marshall, and Black-
mun, JJ.). These justices contended that classifications based on race should be subjected to
the same standard as gender classifications. Jennifer M. Bott, Note, From Bakke to Croson:
The Affirmative Action Quagmire and the D.C, Circuit's Approach to FCC Minority Preference
Policies, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 845, 849 n.27 (1990). This test requires an "important gov-
ernmental objective" be articulated and that the classification be "substantially related to"
1992]
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Thus, Metro Broadcasting does not pave the way for future affirmative
action programs as some have suggested.' 8 It only confirms that affirma-
tive action has an uncertain and perilous future. 9
Additionally, affirmative action programs are in danger of extinction
because two of the five justices who comprised the majority in Metro
Broadcasting have since retired from the Court. 20 After serving on the
Supreme Court for nearly thirty-four years,2 ' Justice Brennan's final ma-
jority opinion was Metro Broadcasting. 2 2 David Souter, who has since
replaced Justice Brennan, has yet to make his views on affirmative action
those objectives. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 359 (quoting Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317
(1977) (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)).
In contrast, classifications based on a non-suspect class are subject to a lower level or
rational basis scrutiny. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 496 (1986). A
classification will pass the rational basis test if it is rationally related to a legitimate end. Mary
C. Daly, Affirmative Action, Equal Access and the Supreme Court's 1988 Term: The Rehnquist
Court Takes a Sharp Turn to the Right, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1057, 1103 (1990).
18. Professor Kathleen Sullivan of Harvard Law School stated Metro Broadcasting is "a
green light for many federally initiated affirmative action programs." Neal A. Lewis, Court
Ruling Encourages Affirmative Action, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1990, § 1, at 12.
19. Metro Broadcasting is likely to be severely limited in the future, as evidenced by the
strong dissenting opinions of the Court's most recent appointees. The three newest members
of the Supreme Court, prior to the retirement of Justices Brennan and Marshall, comprised
three out of the four dissenting votes. All three were appointed by President Reagan. Presi-
dent Reagan appointed Justice O'Connor in 1981. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONS1TFU-
TIONAL LAW, at lxvi (1986). Justice Scalia, who replaced Chief Justice Burger, was confirmed
in 1986. David M. O'Brien, Rehnquist Plus Scalia Equals a Radically New Court, L.A. TIMES,
August 17, 1986, § 5, at 3. Finally, Justice Kennedy was appointed by President Reagan and
confirmed in February 1988. Al Kamen, Kennedy Confirmed, 97-0; Senate Approves Supreme
Court Nomination, WASH. POST, February 4, 1988, at Al.
Further evidence that the dissenting opinion will soon become the majority opinion is that
"the five oldest justices (with an average age of 78) formed the majority, while the four young-
est (with an average age of 58) formed the dissent" in Metro Broadcasting. James Scanlan,
Affirmative Action: The Court's Surprise?, TEX. LAW., July 20, 1990, at S14. As seen by the
retirement of Justices Brennan and Marshall, this age factor could play an important part in
future decisions.
20. The majority opinion in Metro Broadcasting comprised Justices Brennan, Marshall,
White, Stevens, and Blackmun. After the case was decided in June 1990, Justices Brennan and
Marshall announced their retirement.
In discussing the likely developments in the affirmative action area, Professor Jesse H.
Choper pointed out that change appeared to be a real possibility with Justice Brennan's retire-
ment, because these cases have almost always been decided by 5-4 votes. Constitutional Law
Conference, 59 U.S.L.W. 2272 (November 6, 1990). Additionally, Justices O'Connor and
White continue to express reservations in this area. Id See also Bruce Fein & William Brad-
ford Reynolds, Brennan's Law: How Durable a Legacy, LEGAL TIMES, August 13, 1990 (dis-
cussing that Brennan's last majority opinion seems endangered because "the reasoning of
Metro Broadcasting was patently flimsy, garnered but five votes, and is unlikely to be persua-
sive with Brennan's successor").
21. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, at lvii (1986).
22. Frank Michelman, A Tribute to Justice William J, Brennan, Jr., 104 HARV. L. REV.
22, 26 (1990).
1992] EQUAL PROTECTION CLA USE
clear. 23 Recently, Justice Marshall also announced his retirement 24 and
will be replaced by Clarence Thomas, a known opponent of affirmative
action quotas.25 Thus, Metro Broadcasting is likely to be severely limited
in the future26 because of its weaknesses2" and the retirement of two
23. Justice Souter's views on affirmative action are unknown at this time, although he once
argued that the government "should not be involved in this [referring to affirmative action]."
Sam Fulwood III & Ronald J. Ostrow, Don't Quiz Souter, Thornburgh Warns Senators, L.A.
TIMES, July 26, 1990, at A20 (quoting address by David Souter, New England Aeronautical
Institute and Daniel Webster College Commencement Ceremony (May 30, 1976)).
24. Justice Thurgood Marshall announced his retirement on June 27, 1991, after serving
twenty-four years on the Supreme Court. Andrew Rosenthal, Marshall Retires from High
Court; Blow to Liberals, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1991, at Al.
25. See David G. Savage & Sara Fritz, Thomas' Rise Inspires Friends, Irks Liberals; Nomi-
nee: The Judge as a Toddler had Lived in a Sharecropper's Shack Critics Say He Turned His
Back on the Less Fortunate in Climb from Rags to Republicanism, L.A. TIMES, July 2, 1991, at
Al; Marlene Cimons, A Look at Possible Supreme Court Candidates; Clarence Thomas, L.A.
TIMES, June 29, 1991, at A18; David G. Savage, Black Judicial Candidate Stirs Debate;
Courts" Clarence Thomas is a Rising Star in the GOP. But His Critics Charge His Views on
Discrimination Are a Cause for Concern, L.A. TIMEs, February 5, 1990, at A16.
26. "With Justice Brennan's departure from the court, it seems unlikely that Metro Broad-
casting and Astroline will remain more than a footnote in the annals of Supreme Court history,
because I can't imagine any replacement for Justice Brennan supporting his views on affirma-
tive action." Law Professor Predicts Major Changes Stemming from Justice Brennan's Retire-
ment, [August 9, 1990] WASH. INSIDER (BNA) (quoting Carin Clauss, a University of
Wisconsin Law School professor and the solicitor of labor under President Carter). "Since the
Court predicated the legality of the set-aside on the important governmental objective of
achieving broadcasting diversity, the Metro [Broadcasting] holding may well be limited to cases
involving first amendment considerations if Justice Brennan's replacement, Justice Souter,
joins the dissenters when the Court inevitably revisits the issue." Robert E. Suggs, Racial
Discrimination in Business Transactions, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1257, 1258 (1991) (citations
omitted).
27. Justice Brennan, known for his ability to build coalitions to achieve a desired result,
should not be faulted for the opinion's weaknesses. He most likely had to write Metro Broad-
casting this way in order to gain a majority opinion. Neal Devins, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
F.C.C.: Requiem for a Heavyweight, 69 TEX. L. REV. 125, 128 (1990). See Marcia Coyle, A
Final Victory Marks the End of a Career, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 13, 1990, at S4 (noting that Metro
Broadcasting reflects Justice Brennan's "consummate skill and brilliance in fine-tuning deci-
sions in such a way that the essential fifth vote either signed on to or wrote the majority
opinion"). See also Mark Tushnet, The Optimist's Tale, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1257, 1263 (1984)
(observing that the Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), opinion's "very awkwardness reveals
much about what Justice Brennan really was doing: not writing a carefully crafted opinion,
not being profound, but building a coalition").
In order to garner Justice White's vote, who is known for his strong judicial deference to
Congress, Justice Brennan may have had to limit the application of intermediate scrutiny to
congressionally mandated preferences, rather than allowing it to be applied to all benign meas-
ures. Justice White was in the majority in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469
(1989), and advocated a strict scrutiny test for a state action, but in Metro Broadcasting he
advocated intermediate scrutiny for federal actions. Neal Devins, Metro Broadcasting v.
F.C.C.: Requiem for a Heavyweight, 69 TEX. L. REv. 125, 128 n.21 (1990). See also Neal A.
Lewis, Court Ruling Encourages Affirmative Action, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1990, § 1, at 12 (Pro-
fessor Charles G. Fried of Harvard Law School stated, "Congress looms very large in [Justice]
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strong proponents of affirmative action.28
The first section of this note sets forth a statement of the case and
presents a brief history of the Federal Communications Commission
("FCC"), which enacted the affirmative action programs at issue.29 The
next section discusses the opinions of the Supreme Court in Metro Broad-
casting. 30 The third section presents an overview of the Supreme Court's
major decisions on affirmative action prior to Metro Broadcasting and
explores the conflict between Croson and Metro Broadcasting.31 It also
evinces an argument that an intermediate level of scrutiny should apply
to all affirmative action programs.3 2 The note concludes with an analysis
of the implications of Metro Broadcasting, including the paradox between
gender and race-based classifications created by this decision.33
Although Metro Broadcasting provides a proper result by upholding the
minority preference policies at issue, the Court's incorrect reasoning
heightens the confusion in the affirmative action area.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In Metro Broadcasting, the Supreme Court considered the constitu-
tionality of the FCC's minority preference policies in two combined
cases.34 The two policies at issue in the appellate cases of Winter Park
Communications v. F C C ("Winter Park") " and Shurberg Broadcasting
of Hartford, Inc. v. E C. C. ("Shurberg") 36 were, respectively: (1) a pro-
White's jurisprudence."); David G. Savage, Court OKs Affirmative Action at Federal Level,
L.A. TIMES, June 28, 1990, at AI (Professor Laurence H. Tribe of Harvard Law School said of
Justice White: "He is a strong nationalist who defers to congressional power.").
28. "[G]iven the replacement of Justice William Brennan with Justice David Souter, Metro
Broadcasting's slim majority seems vulnerable." Neal Devins, The Rhetoric of Equality, 44
VAND. L. REV. 15, 36 (1991).
A comparison of the voting alignment of the remaining Justices further evidences the
likelihood of Metro Broadcasting being limited. The four dissenting Justices vote together over
eighty percent of the time. The Supreme Court, 1989 Term: Leading Cases, 104 HARV. L.
REV. 359, 360 (1990). Justice O'Connor agrees with Chief Justice Rehnquist 81.9% of the
time, Justice Scalia agrees 81.3% and Justice Kennedy 82.6%. Id. Therefore, without Justices
Brennan and Marshall, who only voted with Chief Justice Rehnquist 38.1% and 37.4% of the
time, the Chief Justice should easily be able to garner a majority in almost every case.
29. See infra notes 34-117 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 118-147 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 148-293 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 294-322 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 323-361 and accompanying text.
34. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3002 (1990).
35. 873 F.2d 347 (D.C. Cir. 1989), aff'dsub nom. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 110
S. Ct. 2997 (1990).
36. 876 F.2d 902 (D.C. Cir. 1989), rev'd sub nom. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 110
S. Ct. 2997 (1990).
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gram awarding a preference for minority ownership in comparative pro-
ceedings; and (2) a minority "distress sale" program, allowing an existing
broadcast station in limited circumstances to be transferred to a minor-
ity-controlled firm.3 In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court held
that the programs passed intermediate scrutiny and did not violate equal
protection principles,38 thereby affirming the decision in Winter Park and
reversing the decision in Shurberg. 39
A. Prior Legislative History
In the Communications Act of 1934, ° Congress delegated exclusive
authority to the FCC to grant television and radio broadcast licenses if
"public interest, convenience, and necessity would be served thereby."'41
If no competitors apply for the license to broadcast or object to the grant-
ing of the license, the FCC may award a license if it serves the public
interest.42 Once a license is granted, the licensee may not assign it to
another entity unless application is made to the FCC.43
If two entities apply for the same license, the FCC conducts a com-
parative hearing to determine which applicant is more deserving.' In
such a proceeding, the FCC weighs both the quantitative and qualitative
attributes of competing applicants. 45 The FCC primarily looks at six
quantitative factors:46 (1) diversification;47 (2) integration of ownership
37. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3002.
38. Id. at 3008-09.
39. Id at 3028.
40. Communications Act, ch. 652, § 307, 48 Stat. 1083 (1934) (codified as amended at 47
U.S.C. §§ 151-610 (1982)).
41. 47 U.S.C. § 307(c) (1982). See also 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 301, 303, 309 (1982).
42. Matthew L. Spitzer, The Constitutionality of Licensing Broadcasters, 64 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 990, 997 (1989) (quoting 47 U.S.C. §§ 307(d), 309(a) (1982)).
43. See 47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (1982). Section 310(d) provides that when a licensee applies for
permission to assign or transfer control, "the Commission may not consider whether the pub-
lic interest, convenience, and necessity might be served by the transfer, assignment or disposal
of the permit or license to a person other than the proposed transferee or assignee."
44. In Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. F. C. C, the Supreme Court held that when the Commis-
sion is faced with two mutually exclusive applications for licenses-that is, two proposed sta-
tions that would be incompatible technologically, it is obligated to set the applicants for a
comparative hearing. 326 U.S. 327, 333 (1945).
45. The general evaluative framework used by the Commission in the comparative process
was first set out in its Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearing& 1 F.C.C.2d 393
(1965).
46. Id at 394-99.
47. "The Commission deemed it to be relevant whether an applicant's owners have owner-
ship interests in other broadcast stations and other media of mass communication." West
Michigan Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 735 F.2d 601, 604 (D.C. Cir. 1984). To increase diversi-
fication of control, the FCC gives credit to entities controlled by those with few or no interests
in other mass media entities. Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1
1992]
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and management;48 (3) proposed programming;' (4) past broadcast rec-
ord;50 (5) efficient use of frequency; 5 and (6) the character of the appli-
cant.52 If the applicants exhibit no quantitative differences, the FCC
assesses a number of qualitative factors, including the race or gender of
the owner, local residence, and past broadcast experience.53
Initially, the FCC did not consider race a factor in comparative pro-
ceedings for new licenses.54 Instead, it was FCC policy that minority
ownership warranted no preference, unless the record indicated that the
owner's race was likely to affect the station's broadcast service. 55 The
FCC, however, repeatedly indicated that it was committed to providing
diverse programming because it "is a key objective not only of the Com-
munications Act of 1934 but also of the First Amendment. ' '5 6 To facili-
tate diverse viewpoints, the FCC adopted regulations prohibiting
discrimination against minorities in the broadcast industry, including
F.C.C.2d 393, 394-95 (1965). This is the most important criterion because it reflects the FCC's
preference for awarding licenses to those who do not own interests in another media. Matthew
L. Spitzer, The Constitutionality of Licensing Broadcasters, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 990, 998 (1989)
(citing Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 394-95 (1965)).
48. "The greater the degree of integration of ownership and management, the easier it is to
focus on those responsible for station operations." West Michigan Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C.,
735 F.2d 601, 604 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Under this criterion, the FCC prefers applicants whose
owners promise to work full-time managing the station. Matthew L. Spitzer, The Constitution-
ality of Licensing Broadcasters, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 990, 998-99 (1989). "This criterion is
thought to have two important justifications. First, an owner who is working full-time in the
station must necessarily live locally .... Second, an owner will have an increased incentive to
ensure that the station complies with all the rules and regulations of the FCC." Id. at 999
n.49.
49. Only exceptional programming proposals are considered relevant. "[M]inor differ-
ences among applicants are apt to prove to be of no significance .... Decisional significance
will be accorded only to material and substantial differences between applicants' proposed
program plans." Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 397
(1965).
50. Only unusually compliant or troublesome behavior of a broadcast owner is considered
relevant. Id. at 398.
51. Proposals receive merit if, for engineering reasons, they would be more efficient than
competing applicants. Id
52. Character evidence is irrelevant unless a significant character deficiency exists. Id. at
399.
53. Brief for Federal Communication Commission at 3, Metro Broadcasting v. F.C.C., 110
S. Ct. 2997 (1990) (No. 89-453). See T.V. 9, Inc. v. F.C.C., 495 F.2d 929, 941 & n.2 (D.C. Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 986 (1974); In re WPIX, Inc., 68 F.C.C.2d 381, 411-12 (1978);
Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 394 (1965).
54. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3004 (1990).
55. Id. See In re Mid-Florida Television Corp., 33 F.C.C.2d 1, 17-18 (1972), rev'd sub
nom. T.V. 9, Inc. v. F.C.C., 495 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 986 (1974).
56. Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities, 68 F.C.C.2d
979, 981 (1978). See also Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d
393, 394 (1965).
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regulations requiring licensees to guarantee equal opportunity in all as-
pects of station employment. 5"
Following a series of decisions by the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals, 8 the FCC reviewed the adequacy of its diversity goals and con-
cluded that
the views of racial minorities continue to be inadequately repre-
sented in the broadcast media. This situation is detrimental not
only to the minority audience but to all of the viewing and lis-
tening public. Adequate representation of minority viewpoints
in programming serves not only the needs and interests of the
minority community but also enriches and educates the non-
minority audience.59
Based on these findings, the FCC outlined three programs implementing
a minority ownership policy."
First, the FCC outlined a policy to consider minority ownership as a
factor in determining licensing decisions.6" The FCC declared that mi-
nority ownership would be considered a "plus" to be weighed with all
other relevant factors in a comparative hearing.62 Second, the FCC es-
tablished a "distress sale" policy,63 which allows a broadcaster whose
57. Brief Amicus Curiae of The National League of Cities, National Conference of State
Legislatures, National Association of Counties, Council of State Governments, U.S. Confer-
ence of Mayors, and International City Management Association in Support of Respondents at
4, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990) (No. 89-453). See, e.g., Nondis-
crimination Employment Practices of Broadcast Licensees, 18 F.C.C.2d 240 (1969). See also
Nondiscrimination in the Employment Policies and Practices of Broadcast Licensees, 60
F.C.C.2d 226 (1976); Nondiscrimination in the Employment Policies and Practices of Broad-
cast Licensees, 54 F.C.C.2d 354 (1975); Nondiscrimination Employment Practices of Broad-
cast Licensees, 23 F.C.C.2d 430 (1970).
58. See, e.g., Garrett v. F.C.C., 513 F.2d 1056 (D.C. Cir. 1975); T.V. 9, Inc. v. F.C.C., 495
F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 986 (1974); Citizens Communications Center
v. F.C.C., 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
In a 1973 decision, T. V 9, Inc-, the court held that the Communications Act required the
FCC to give favorable consideration to a station when racial minorities would be involved in
ownership and management. 495 F.2d at 938. Two years later in Garrett, the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals reaffirmed their position by stating that "black ownership and
participation together are themselves likely to bring about programming that is responsive to
the needs of the black citizenry." 513 F.2d at 1056. Carl Hilliard, Constitutional Conflict over
Race and Gender Preferences in Commercial Radio and Television Licensing 38 U. KAN. L.
REV. 343, 345 (1990) (quoting Garrett, 513 F.2d at 1063).
59. Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities, 68 F.C.C.2d
979, 980-81 (1978) (footnotes omitted).
60. Id at 982-84.
61. Id. at 982.
62. In re WPIX, Inc., 68 F.C.C.2d 381, 411-12 (1978).
63. Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities, 68 F.C.C.2d
979, 983 (1978).
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license is designated for either a revocation hearing or a renewal hearing
to sell the license to an FCC-approved minority enterprise." Normally,
a licensee may not assign or transfer a license that comes into question
until the FCC has resolved its doubts in a noncomparative hearing. 65
The distress sale policy is an exception to the rule and gives licensees a
substantial incentive to exercise this option." Under the distress sale, the
licensee has two options: (1) the licensee may gamble that it will prevail
in a noncomparative hearing, but if it loses, the FCC will take over the
station without compensation; or (2) the licensee may sell via a distress
sale before the hearing and still salvage some portion of the value of the
license.67 Finally, the FCC adopted a tax certificate program, which de-
fers a licensee's capital gains tax if it sells to a minority buyer.68 The first
two minority preference programs were at issue in Metro Broadcasting. 
69
B. Winter Park Communications, Inc. v. F.C.C. / Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C.
1. Statement of Facts
In 1982, the FCC assigned a new television channel to Orlando,
Florida.7' The following year, mutually exclusive7" applications to build
and operate the television station were filed with the FCC by three enti-
ties: Metro Broadcasting, Incorporated ("Metro"), Winter Park Com-
munications, Incorporated ("Winter"), and Rainbow Broadcasting
Company ("Rainbow").7 2 An administrative law judge issued a decision
awarding the channel to Metro.73 The FCC Review Board then reversed
and ruled that Rainbow's proposal was both quantitatively and qualita-
tively superior to Metro's.74 Specifically, Rainbow was awarded prefer-
64. Commission Policy Regarding the Advancement of Minority Ownership in Broadcast-
ing, 92 F.C.C.2d 849, 851 (1982).
65. Jefferson Radio Co. v. F.C.C., 340 F.2d 781, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
66. Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford, Inc. v. F.C.C., 876 F.2d 902, 904 (D.C. Cit. 1989),
rev'd sub nom. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990).
67. Id.
68. Bruce R. Wilde, FCC Tax Certificates for Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Facili-
ties: A Critical Reexamination of Policy, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 979, 981 (1990). This program
was not at issue in Metro Broadcasting, and will not be discussed further in this note.
69. 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3002 (1990).
70. Winter Park Communications, Inc. v. F.C.C., 873 F.2d 347, 349 (D.C. Cir. 1989),
aff'd sub nom. Metro Broadcasting v. F.C.C., 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990).
71. Applicants are considered mutually exclusive when the two proposed stations would
be incompatible technologically. Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. F.C.C., 326 U.S. 327, 332-33
(1945). See Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3004 n.5.
72. Winter Park 873 F.2d at 349.
73. In re Metro Broadcasting, Inc., 96 F.C.C.2d 1073, 1088 (1983).
74. Brief Amicus Curiae of The National Association of Black Owned Broadcasters, Inc.
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ence based on the ninety percent minority participation of its owners and
the significant broadcast experience of one of its owners. 7
The FCC then denied review, 76 prompting Winter and Metro to ap-
peal. Prior to the case being heard by the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals, however, the FCC held the proceedings in abeyance pending
further examination of the validity of its minority and female ownership
policies." When the FCC announced the possibility of terminating its
affirmative action policies in 1987, Congress responded by signing a reso-
lution into law forbidding the FCC from using any of its appropriated
funds "to repeal, to retroactively apply changes in, or to continue a reex-
amination of" its policies regarding minority and female ownership of
broadcasting licenses.71 In compliance with this legislation, the FCC re-
activated the case and affirmed its earlier order granting Rainbow's appli-
cation. 79 The case returned to the court of appeals, and a divided panel
affirmed the FCC's order awarding the license to Rainbow."0 Metro then
appealed to the Supreme Court.81
2. The Court of Appeals' Holding
In Winter Park, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals relied on
West Michigan Broadcasting Co. v. F. C. C. ("West Michigan") 82 in find-
ing the minority preference policy constitutional.8" The majority noted
that the West Michigan court upheld the same minority preference policy
for two principal reasons.84 First, the policy was not a rigid quota sys-
tem, but rather "a consideration of minority status as but one factor in a
competitive multi-factor selection system that is designed to obtain a di-
verse mix of broadcasters."8 5 Second, the court found that Congress'
authorization to the FCC to award minority preferences in lotteries86
and Congressman Edolphus Towns in Support of Respondents at 3, Metro Broadcasting, Inc.
v. F.C.C., 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990) (No. 89-453).
75. In re Metro Broadcasting, Inc., 99 F.C.C.2d 688, 703-4 (Rev. Bd. 1984), rev. denied,
FCC 85-558 (released Oct. 18, 1985).
76. In re Metro Broadcasting, Inc., No. 83-140, 1985 F.C.C. LEXIS 2415, slip op. at 2
(Oct. 18, 1985).
77. Notice of Inquiry on Racial, Ethnic or Gender Classifications, 1 F.C.C.R. 1315 (1986).
78. Pub. L. No. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329, 1329-31 (1987).
79. In re Metro Broadcasting, Inc., 3 F.C.C.R. 866 (1988).
80. Winter Park 873 F.2d at 349.
81. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3007 (1990).
82. 735 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
83. Winter Park 873 F.2d at 349.
84. Id. at 353.
85. Id (emphasis in original).
86. In 1982, Congress amended 47 U.S.C. 309(i) to authorize the FCC to award minority
preferences in lotteries. 47 U.S.C. § 309(i)(1) (1982).
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"showed clear recognition of the extreme underrepresentation of minori-
ties and their perspectives in the broadcast mass media""7 due to "past
inequities stemming from racial and ethnic discrimination." 88 Finally,
the majority concluded that the Supreme Court's Croson 89 decision did
not undermine the validity of West Michigan.9' The court held that
Croson did not affect the FCC's minority preference program, because
the policy was flexible with no "quotas or fixed targets" and had gained
"Congress' express approval."91
The dissent disagreed with the court's constitutional analysis and
concluded that Croson "largely undermined" the validity of West Michi-
gan. 92 In the dissent's view, the FCC's asserted diversity rationale failed
the strict scrutiny standard used in Croson,93 because no evidence indi-
cated minority ownership would promote minority programming.94 The
dissent reaffirmed the Croson Court's concern, in noting that the FCC's
assumption that race predicted conduct was based on racial stereotyp-
ing."' The dissent did not find the minority preference policy unconstitu-
tional, but instead would have remanded the case to the FCC for further
fact-finding. 96
C. Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford, Inc. v. F.C.C.
1. Statement of Facts
The dispute in Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford, Inc. v. FC.C. 97
arose from a series of attempts by Faith Center, Incorporated ("Faith")
to execute a minority distress sale. 98 In December 1983, Shurberg
Broadcasting of Hartford, Incorporated ("Shurberg") applied to the
FCC for a permit that was mutually exclusive99 of Faith's renewal appli-
87. West Michigan Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 735 F.2d 601, 613 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
88. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 765, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2261, 2287.
89. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
90. Winter Park, 873 F.2d at 354-55.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 356 (Williams, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
93. Id. at 361. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White and Kennedy, JJ.); id. at 520 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
94. Winter Park, 873 F.2d at 358.
95. Id. at 361 (Williams, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
96. Id. at 369.
97. 876 F.2d 902 (D.C. Cir. 1989), rev'd sub norn. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 110
S. Ct. 2997 (1990).
98. In re Faith Center, Inc., 88 F.C.C.2d 788, 788 (1981).
99. Applicants are considered mutually exclusive when the two proposed stations would
be incompatible technologically. Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. F.C.C., 326 U.S. 327, 332 (1945).
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cation for a channel in Hartford, Connecticut.' I ° Before the FCC ruled
on the application, however, Faith sought the FCC's approval for a dis-
tress sale, requesting permission to sell its license to minority applicant
Astroline Communications Company ("Astroline").' °' The FCC ap-
proved Faith's petition and allowed Faith to assign its broadcast license
to Astroline without a comparative proceeding.
10 2
Shurberg appealed the FCC order to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit, but disposition was delayed
pending completion of the FCC's inquiry into its minority ownership
policies.' 03 After Congress passed the appropriations legislation,"4 how-
ever, the FCC reaffirmed its order granting Faith's request.'o 5 A divided
court of appeals invalidated the order and held that the FCC's minority
distress sale policy was unconstitutional." 6 Astroline then appealed to
the Supreme Court.'0 7
2. The Court of Appeals' Holding
The court of appeals in Shurberg held per curiam'10 that the minor-
ity distress sale was unconstitutional under the standard of strict scru-
tiny ." 9 Judge Silberman first rejected the distress sale program as a
remedy for past discrimination because he found: (1) the program was
not tied to the effects of prior discrimination; (2) the FCC had not con-
sidered race-neutral alternatives; and (3) the program imposed an undue
burden on applicant Shurberg." ° Judge Silberman accepted the pro-
gram's diversity goal as a compelling governmental purpose, but rejected
the minority ownership and programming diversity nexus."' Judge
MacKinnon concurred in the judgment but disagreed pointedly with Sil-
berman's rejection of the nexus between diversity of station ownership
100. Shurberg, 876 F.2d at 905.
101. Id.
102. In re Faith Center, Inc., 99 F.C.C.2d 1164 (1984), rev'd on other grounds, Shurberg
Broadcasting of Hartford, Inc. v. F.C.C., 876 F.2d 902 (1989).
103. In re Metro Broadcasting Inc., 1985 F.C.C. LEXIS 2415, No. 83-1408, slip op. at 2
(Oct. 18, 1985).
104. Notice of Inquiry on Racial, Ethnic or Gender Classifications, 1 F.C.C.R. 1315 (1986).
105. In re Faith Center, Inc., 3 F.C.C.R. 868 (1988).
106. Shurberg 876 F.2d at 902.
107. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3008 (1990).
108. "By the court. A phrase used to distinguish an opinion of the whole court from an
opinion written by any one judge." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1023 (5th ed. 1979).
109. Shurberg, 876 F.2d at 926.
110. Id. at 915-18.
111. Id. at 920-21.
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and diversity of programming. "2 He held that a nexus existed, but
found the program not narrowly tailored because of the unlimited
number of licenses that could be transferred.
1 13
Chief Judge Wald dissented, arguing that the majority rejected "a
thoughtfully conceived and monitored program aimed at attaining a le-
gitimate congressionally mandated end.""' 4 She rejected the notion that
courts can inspect the adequacy of deliberations by Congress, and found
a nexus between minority ownership and programming." 5 Chief Judge
Wald concluded that promotion of diverse programming was a compel-
ling interest and that the program was constitutional.' 16 In addition, she
found no undue burden because "the near-monopoly exercised by nonmi-
norities over broadcast media-they control approximately 98% [ninety-
eight percent] of all broadcast licenses-and the very limited circum-
stances in which the distress sale policy can be invoked, suggest that the
burden the policy places on nonminority applicants is acceptable.""' 7
III. THE OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
A. The Majority Opinion
In Metro Broadcasting, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall,
White, Blackmun, and Stevens, upheld the two minority" 8 preference
programs at issue." 9 The Court began its analysis by pointing out that
Congress had specifically approved the FCC policies.' 20 The Court de-
clared that "when a program employing a benign racial classification is
adopted by an administrative agency at the explicit direction of Con-
gress, we are 'bound to approach our task with appropriate deference to
the Congress.' "21 Instead of applying a strict level of scrutiny, the
112. "[I]t is difficult to dispute the assertion that Congress found there was a nexus between
minority ownership and programming diversity." Id at 932 (MacKinnon, J., concurring).
113. Id. at 931. The fact that only thirty-eight licenses have been distributed via distress
sales in ten years clearly disputes this argument. Id at 937 (Wald, C.J., dissenting).
114. Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford, Inc. v. F.C.C., 876 F.2d 902, 934 (D.C. Cir. 1989),
rev'd sub nom. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990) (Wald, C.J.,
dissenting).
115. Id. at 944-48.
116. Id. at 947.
117. Id. at 952 (footnote omitted).
118. A minority is defined as "those of Black, Hispanic Surnamed, American Eskimo, Al-
eut, American Indian and Asiatic American extraction." Statement of Policy on Minority
Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities, 68 F.C.C.2d 979, 980 n.8 (1978).
119. 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3028 (1990).
120. Id. at 3008.
121. Id. (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 472 (1980) (Burger, C.J., joined by
White and Powell, JJ.)).
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Supreme Court adopted the less restrictive test of intermediate scrutiny,
which requires a program to be substantially related to an important gov-
ernmental objective. 22 Under intermediate scrutiny, the Court held,
"benign race-conscious measures mandated by Congress... are constitu-
tionally permissible to the extent that they serve important governmental
objectives within the power of Congress and are substantially related to
achievement of those objectives." 12' The Supreme Court found that
Congress and the FCC had selected the minority ownership policies pri-
marily to promote diversity, 124 which was an important governmental
objective. 125
In addressing the second prong of the test, the Supreme Court de-
ferred to the FCC and Congress.1 26 The Court considered the observa-
tions in the FCC's Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of
Broadcasting Facilities, which declared that minority ownership was a
"significant way of fostering the inclusion of minority views in the area of
programming" and that "[flull minority participation in the ownership
and management of broadcast facilities results in a more diverse selection
of programming."1 27 The Court pointed to recent congressional action
requiring the FCC to maintain their programs without alteration 2 ' and
the long history of congressional support for minority preference poli-
cies. 129 The legislative history states: "Congress has expressed its sup-
port for such policies in the past and has found that promoting diversity
of ownership of broadcast properties satisfies important public policy
122. Id. at 3008.
123. Id. at 3008-09.
124. The Court previously held that safeguarding the public's right to receive diverse views
was an integral part of the FCC's mission. Kay A. Hoogland, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
F.C.C.: Nonremedial Affirmative Action Becomes an Exclusive Prerogative of Congress, 16 EM-
PLOYEE REL. L.J. 301, 306 (Winter 1990/91). "The benefits of such diversity are not limited
to the members of minority groups who gain access to the broadcasting industry by virtue of
the ownership policies; rather, the benefits redound to all members of the viewing and listening
audience." Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3011.
125. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3010. In support of this, the Court applied the
scarcity rationale, stating that "because of the scarcity of [electromagnetic] frequencies, the
Government is permitted to put restraints on licensees in favor of others whose views should
be expressed on this unique medium." Id. (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395
U.S. 367, 390 (1969)). But see Jonathan W. Emord, The First Amendment Invalidity of FCC
Ownership Regulations, 38 CATH. U.L. REv. 401 (1989), for an argument that the scarcity
rationale has been eroded with the advent of technology.
126. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3019-25.
127. 68 F.C.C.2d 979, 981 (1978).
128. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3012. The Court referred to the appropriations legis-
lation enacted by Congress. Notice of Inquiry on Racial, Ethnic or Gender Classifications, I
F.C.C.R. 1315 (1986).
129. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3012-16.
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goals."'
130
The Court next observed that the race-conscious programs at issue
did not rest on impermissible stereotypes. 31  The FCC did not assert
that all minority owners would provide diverse programming; rather, it
claimed that increased minority ownership would, in the aggregate, re-
sult in diversity.' 32 The Court found that the nexus between diversity
and minority ownership was further evidenced by studies showing that
minority ownership impacts broadcasting by affecting the images por-
trayed in local news, including the amount of time devoted to minority
issues, the number of minority employees, and the avoidance of racial
and ethnic stereotype images. 133 The Court found the policies narrowly
tailored because the FCC had considered other race-neutral alternatives
and the policies would be periodically reviewed by the FCC and
Congress. 1
3 4
Justice Stevens, in his separate concurrence, endorsed a forward-
looking or future benefit approach to affirmative action.1 35  He also
praised the Court for explicitly rejecting the proposition that a racial
classification can be used only as a remedy for past discrimination.
1 36
Thus, a majority of the Court upheld the two minority preference poli-
cies at issue by applying intermediate scrutiny. 137 The Court held the
preference programs withstood intermediate scrutiny because the pro-
grams were substantially related to the important governmental goal of
130. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 765, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1982).
131. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3016 (emphasis added).
132. Id.
133. Kay A. Hoogland, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C.: Nonremedial Affirmative Ac-
tion Becomes an Exclusive Prerogative of Congress 16 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 301, 307 (Winter
1990/91). The dissenting opinions argued that no relation existed between the multicultural-
ism of programming and the race of the station owners. Others have argued that "clearly
there is some relation between programming and the beliefs of an owner" because a relation
exists between "one's heritage and one's beliefs." Patricia J. Williams, Metro Broadcasting,
Inc. v. F.C.C.: Regrouping in Singular Times, 104 HARV. L. REv. 525, 533 (1990) (emphasis
in original).
For example, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) found a strong correlation be-
tween minority ownership and diversity of programming. See CRS, Minority Broadcast Sta-
tion Ownership and Broadcast Programming: Is There a Nexus? (June 29, 1988). Only twenty
percent of stations with no African-American ownership attempted to direct programming to
African-Americans versus sixty-five percent of those with African-American ownership. See
id at 13. In addition, only ten percent of those stations without Hispanic ownership targeted
Hispanic programming, while fifty-nine percent of stations with Hispanic owners did so. See
id. at 13, 15.
134. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3019-25.
135. Id. at 3028 (Stevens, J., concurring).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 3008-09.
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. Prior Case Law
Before the Supreme Court's decision in Metro Broadcasting, the
Court had discussed numerous times the legality of benign programs that
used race or gender as allocative criteria to benefit minority groups.148 In
the last twelve years, the Court has struggled with the constitutionality of
government-sponsored minority preferences in four main cases: Regents
of the University of California v. Bakke, '49 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 15 0 Wy-
gant v. Jackson Board of Education, '' and City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co.'52 The Supreme Court's fractured decisions addressing the
subject reflect the complexity of the constitutional issues. 153 These four
148. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union, The New York City Com-
mission on Human Rights, and The NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund in Support of
Petitioner in No. 89-700 and in Support of Respondents in No. 89- 453 at 4, Astroline Commu-
nications Co. v. Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990) (No. 89-700);
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990) (No. 89-453). See, e.g., Johnson v.
Transp. Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (upholding under Title VII a volun-
tary plan adopted by a public employer that used female gender as a "plus" factor to determine
promotions in "traditionally segregated" jobs); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987)
(upholding judicially imposed racial quota for promotions, in order to remedy persistent viola-
tions of Title VII); Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986)
(upholding consent decree settling Title VII case extending race-conscious hiring and promo-
tion to benefit nonvictims of proven racial discrimination); Firefighters Local Union No. 1784
v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984) (invalidating unauthorized modification of Title VII consent
decree to provide for race-conscious layoffs in derogation of bona fide seniority system); Mis-
sissippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (excluding students from women's
school of nursing based solely on gender violated Equal Protection Clause); United Steelwork-
ers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (upholding under Title VII a voluntarily established race-
conscious promotion system designed to remedy the effects of past industry-wide discrimina-
tion); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. U.S., 431 U.S. 324 (1977) (protecting rights under
bona fide seniority systems, even when it perpetuates the effects of past racial discrimination);
United Jewish Org. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977) (upholding use of racial criterion to enhance
success of minority candidates in redistricting); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977)
(invalidating presumption of widow dependency because not based on remedial purpose);
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (invalidating gender discrimination in access to beer be-
cause not based on a remedial purpose); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., Inc., 424 U.S. 747
(1976) (upholding race-conscious remedies in Title VII cases); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420
U.S. 636 (1975) (invalidating Social Security benefits confined to widows because purpose was
not remedial); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) (upholding employment preferences
for American Indians in the Bureau of Indian Affairs).
149. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
150. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
151. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
152. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
153. "The doctrinal development of these principles.., was marred by constantly shifting
coalitions of Justices and ambiguous, sometimes contradictory pronouncements in a multitude
of majority, plurality, concurring, and dissenting opinions." Mary C. Daly, Affirmative Action,
Equal Access and the Supreme Court's 1988 Term: The Rehnquist Court Takes a Sharp Turn
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promoting diversity. 38
B. The Dissenting Opinions
Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Scalia and Kennedy, characterized the majority decision as a strong de-
parture from prior precedent, noting that City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co. 139 required the Court to apply strict scrutiny to race-based
classifications." 4 The dissent stated that Metro Broadcasting did not im-
plicate a lower level of scrutiny because the same standard of review
should apply to both the federal and state governments.' 4' The dissent-
ers argued that the programs failed the applicable strict scrutiny stan-
dard of review.
142
Under strict scrutiny, the dissent found that program diversity was
not a compelling governmental interest. '13  According to Justice
O'Connor, "[m]odern equal protection doctrine has recognized only one
such [compelling] interest: remedying the effects of racial discrimina-
tion."'" Under the second prong of strict scrutiny, she found that the
programs were not narrowly tailored because no method existed to define
or measure a particular viewpoint associated with race. 4 , In a separate
dissenting opinion, Justices Kennedy and Scalia equated the majority's
reasoning, in upholding the minority preference programs, to that used
in Plessy v. Ferguson '" and the apartheid laws in South Africa. 147
138. Id.
139. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
140. "To uphold the challenged programs, the Court departs from these fundamental prin-
ciples [that the government may not allocate benefits to individuals based on the assumption
that race determines how they act] and from our traditional requirement that racial classifica-
tions are permissible only if necessary and narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest."
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3029 (1990) (O'Connor, J., joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia and Kennedy, JJ., dissenting).
141. Id at 3030.
142. Id at 3034.
143. Id
144. Id
145. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3037 (1990) (O'Connor, J., joined
by Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia and Kennedy, JJ., dissenting).
146. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). In Plessy, the Court upheld a law mandating segregation on
railroads based upon a purported interest in the riding pleasure of railroad passengers and
promulgated the infamous "separate but equal" doctrine, which was overruled by Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
147. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3044-46 (Kennedy, J. joined by Scalia, J., dissent-
ing). "With a logic both heartless and hollow, they [Justices Kennedy and Scalia] likened the
FCC's racial classification to South Africa's apartheid laws, a comparison that surely would
bemuse Nelson Mandela." A Genuinely Affirmative Action, N.Y. TiMEs, July 2, 1990, at A14.
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cases have generated more than twenty opinions, almost all of which dis-
cuss the constitutional issue of whether the programs violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 4
The Court decided three of the above-referenced cases without es-
tablishing the proper standard of review for affirmative action or benign
race classifications. 5' The Supreme Court's first major collision with mi-
nority preferences occurred in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke ("Bakke"), '56 where the Court struck down a university's admis-
sion program that set aside a specific number of places for minority can-
didates. I 7 A majority of the Court recognized, 58 however, that a
university has a compelling interest in promoting a diverse educational
environment,159 and stated that universities may use race as a factor in
their admission decisions."W Four of the five Justices who reached the
to the Right, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1057, 1060 (1990). See also Mary C. Daly, Some Runs,
Some Hits, Some Errors - Keeping Score in the Affirmative Action Ballpark From Weber to
Johnson, 30 B.C. L. REV. 1 (1988).
154. Additionally, in Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986), Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), and Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978), a majority of the Court never joined one opinion.
155. JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 670 (2d ed. 1983).
156. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
157. Id. at 408-21 (Stevens, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part). The Court divided, however, on the correct reasoning
behind the decision. Four members of the Court-Justices Burger, Stevens, Stewart, and
Rehnquist-found that the program violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000(d)-2000(d)(4) (1976), and thus did not reach the constitutional issue. The Jus-
tices held that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibited exclusion of anyone on account of
race. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 412-21 (Stevens, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined
by Burger, C.J., Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ.). Justice Powell alone held that the program was
unconstitutional. Id. at 315-20 (Powell, J.). In contrast, Justices Brennan, Blackmun, Mar-
shall, and White would have upheld the program because they did not find a Title VII or an
equal protection violation. Id. at 349 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part,
joined by White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.).
158. Justices Powell, Brennan, Blackmun, White, and Marshall.
159. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311.14 (Powell, J.).
160. Justices Powell, Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun formed a majority, holding
that the University could have used race as a factor in admission decisions. Four of these
Justices would have upheld the University of California at Davis ("U.C. Davis") program
under the Equal Protection Clause on the ground that the program was designed to serve an
important interest in "remedying the effects of past societal discrimination." Id. at 362 (Bren-
nan, J., joined by White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.). The Court found that "state educa-
tional institutions need not be color-blind" and may confront the realities of race
discrimination with a properly implemented admissions program. LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-22, at 1529 (2d ed. 1988) (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at
320 (opinion of Powell, J., joined by White, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.)).
Justice Powell, however, rejected the U.C. Davis program because he felt the goal of
diversity could only be pursued by considering minority status as a factor in the admissions
process, not by a rigid quota program. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317 (Powell, J.). He also rejected
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constitutional issue articulated an intermediate level of scrutiny, which
requires a program to be substantially related to an important govern-
mental interest.16 1 Justice Powell alone argued that all racial classifica-
tions should be subject to strict scrutiny.
162
In Fullilove v. Klutznick ("Fullilove"), 163 the Court upheld the use of
a minority quota program analogous to the one struck down in Bakke. '16
The six-to-three decision in Fullilove established the legitimacy of affirm-
ative action programs; 165 however, no single theory commanded the
votes of more than three justices. 166 In the plurality opinion, Chief Jus-
tice Burger found the program permissible for two reasons: (1) Con-
gress' special power under the Fourteenth Amendment allowed it to
enact measures to remedy past discrimination; 167 and (2) the allocation
of federal funds contingent on the use of minority preferences constituted
a valid way of implementing that objective. 168 As in Bakke, however, the
the preference as a remedy for past discrimination because the university had not made any
specific findings of discrimination. Id. at 307-09. "IT]he purpose of helping certain groups
whom the... [s]chool perceived as victims of 'societal discrimination' does not justify a classi-
fication that imposes disadvantages upon persons like respondent." Id. at 310.
161. Id at 359 (Brennan, J., joined by White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting in
part and concurring in part). Under intermediate scrutiny, they found the plan served the
important governmental purpose of remedying the effects of past societal discrimination and
was substantially related to that objective. Id. at 362.
Justice White's position on the applicable standard is unclear. He joined the portion of
Justice Powell's opinion that called for strict scrutiny, but he also stated that on equal protec-
tion issues, he joined the opinions of Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun. See id. at 387
n.7 (White, J.). It would appear that Justice White believes that all truly benign affirmative
action programs will pass strict scrutiny. JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
670 n.50 (2d ed. 1983).
162. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315-20 (Powell, J.).
163. 448 U.S. 448, 492 (1980) (Burger, C.J., joined by White and Powell, JJ.).
164. 438 U.S. at 408-21 (Stevens, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ.).
The Fullilove Court upheld a program that set aside ten percent of its total funds for minority
business enterprises under the Public Works Employment Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6701-6736 (1982).
448 U.S. at 453, 492 (Burger, C.J., joined by White and Powell, JJ.). Minority business enter-
prise is defined as "a business at least 50 per centum of which is owned by minority group
members or, in the case of a publicly owned business, at least 51 per centum of the stock of
which is owned by minority group members." 42 U.S.C. § 6705(0(2) (1982). Minorities are
defined as "Negroes [African-Americans], Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and
Aleuts" who are United States citizens. Id
165. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-22, at 1533 (2d ed.
1988).
166. JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 678 (2d ed. 1983).
167. Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford, Inc. v. F.C.C., 876 F.2d 902, 911 (D.C. Cir. 1989),
rev'd sub nom. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990). See Fullilove, 448
U.S. at 472-78 (Burger, C.J., joined by White and Powell, JJ.).
168. Jennifer M. Bott, Note, From Bakke to Croson: The Affirmative Action Quagmire and
the D.C Circuit's Approach to FCC Minority Preference Policies, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 845,
849 (1990) (citing Fullilove, 448 U.S. 480-92 (Burger, C.J., joined by White and Powell, JJ.)).
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Court rendered its decision without definitively mandating a level of
scrutiny for determining the constitutionality of affirmative action pro-
grams. 6 9 Chief Justice Burger upheld the programs without applying a
standard of review,' 70 while Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun
upheld the program under intermediate scrutiny. 7' Justices Stewart,
Rehnquist, and Stevens dissented because of their steadfast opposition to
the use of racial classifications for granting government benefits.' 72
In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education ("Wygant"), "3 the
Supreme Court 7 4 invalidated a layoff protection plan for minority teach-
ers. ' Members of the majority filed three separate opinions. Justice
169. JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 678 (2d ed. 1983).
Justice Burger, however, repudiated the theory that Congress was to act in a color-blind
manner, holding that "innocent parties" may be constitutionally required to "share the bur-
den" of affirmative action programs intended to "cure the effects of prior discrimination."
Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 482-84 (Burger, C.J., joined by White and Powell, JJ.). Additionally, he
held that "it was within congressional power to act on the assumption that in the past some
nonminority businesses may have reaped competitive benefit over the years from the virtual
exclusion of minority firms from these contracting opportunities." Id at 485. Justices Powell,
Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun concurred in the judgment.
170. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 472-78 (Burger, C.J., joined by White and Powell, JJ.).
171. Id. at 519 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan and Blackmun, JJ., concurring).
172. "Under our Constitution, any official action that treats a person differently on account
of his race or ethnic origin is inherently suspect and presumptively invalid." Id. at 523. In his
dissenting opinion, Justice Stewart took the position that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits
any governmental entity from using race as a basis for allocating benefits and burdens. JOHN
E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 681 (2d ed. 1983). He and Justice Rehnquist
maintained the traditional argument that -[o]ur Constitution is color-blind," stating that "any
official action that treats a person differently on account of his race or ethnic origin is...
invalid." Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 522-23 (Stewart, J., joined by Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quot-
ing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559-60 (1896) (Harlan, J. dissenting)). Justice Stevens, in
a separate dissent, also took a strong position against affirmative action in allowing racial clas-
sifications only for those groups who have suffered a "special wrong." Fullilove, 448 U.S. at
537 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
Justice Brennan's response to the theory that the Constitution is color-blind is that "we
cannot . . . let color blindness become myopia which masks the reality that many 'created
equal' have been treated within our lifetimes as inferior both by the law and by their fellow
citizens." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 327 (Brennan, J., joined by White, Marshall, and Blackmun,
JJ.). For a revisionist reading of the color-blind theory, see Laurence H. Tribe, In What Vision
of the Constitution Must the Law be Colorblind?, 20 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 201, 203 (1986).
173. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
174. As Justice O'Connor concurred based on narrow grounds and no other opinion was
joined by five justices, her concurrence and those parts of Justice Powell's opinion in which she
concurred represent the holding of the Court. Shurberg, 876 F.2d at 911. See Marks v. United
States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
175. 476 U.S. at 273 (opinion of Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Rehnquist and
O'Connor, JJ.). Even though there was no majority opinion, Wygant nonetheless illustrates
that the Court does not believe racial preferences are invalid per se. Jennifer M. Bott, Note,
From Bakke to Croson: The Affirmative Action Quagmire and the D.C. Circuit's Approach to
FCC Minority Preference Policies 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 845, 851 (1990); Tamar
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Powell, writing for the plurality, subjected the program to strict scrutiny
and found no evidence to establish a compelling state interest. 176 He re-
jected both the "role model" theory 17 7 and the societal discrimination
theory as insufficient compelling interests. 78  The plurality then distin-
guished between a hiring plan for minorities and a layoff scheme, and
found the latter not narrowly tailored because it was more intrusive.
179
Justice O'Connor wrote separately and concluded that the hiring
goal at issue was not narrowly tailored because it was incorrectly tied to
percentages of minority teachers and minority students, rather than to
percentages of qualified minority teachers in the labor pool. 18° Justice
Fruchtman, Note, City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.: Charting a Course Through the
Supreme Court's Affirmative Action Decisions, 17 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 699, 707 (1990).
"It is interesting that Justice Rehnquist joins the Wygant plurality because the reasoning
[allowance of racial classifications to remedy prior discrimination] is contrary to the Fullilove
dissent in which he advocated the 'colorblind Constitution.' " Id. (quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S.
at 522 (Stewart, J., joined by Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
176. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277-78 (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Rehnquist and
O'Connor, JJ.).
177. The school board had argued that the layoff protection plan preserved minority teach-
ers who were "role models" for minority students. Id. at 274.
178. Id. at 278.
179. Justice Powell noted that layoff schemes were more intrusive for three reasons. First,
"[i]n cases involving valid hiring goals, the burden to be borne by innocent individuals is dif-
fused to a considerable extent among society generally." Id. at 282 (emphasis in original).
Second, "the rights and expectations surrounding seniority make up what is probably the most
valuable capital asset that the worker owns .... Id. at 283 (quoting Richard Fallon, Jr. &
Paul Weiler, Firefighters v. Stotts: Conflicting Models of Racial Justice, 1984 S. CT. REV. 1, 58
(1984)). Third, "layoffs impose the entire burden of achieving racial equality on particular
individuals, often resulting in serious disruption of their lives." Wygant, 476 U.S. at 283 (Pow-
ell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Rehnquist and O'Connor, JJ.).
180. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 294 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judg-
ment). Justice O'Connor recognized that the Court, though disagreeing on the applicable stan-
dard, was in accord in its belief that a public employer can undertake an affirmative action
program if it is in furtherance of a "legitimate remedial purpose" and its means do not impose
"disproportionate harm" on innocent individuals. Id at 287. Further, she stated that if con-
temporaneous findings of discrimination were required, the value of evidentiary advantages
would diminish because they could only be secured at the expense of other vitally important
values. Id. at 290.
It is interesting to note Justice O'Connor's view in Wygant because it appears to contra-
dict her majority opinion in Croson, where she required a state government to prove specific
and identifiable past discrimination in order to withstand strict scrutiny. See infra notes 182-
194 and accompanying text. Justice O'Connor stated:
If contemporaneous findings were required of public employers in every case as a
precondition to the constitutional validity of their affirmative action efforts, however,
the relative value of these evidentiary advantages would diminish, for they could be
secured only by the sacrifice of other vitally important values.
The imposition of a requirement that public employers make findings that they
have engaged in illegal discrimination before they engage in affirmative action pro-
grams would severely undermine public employers' incentive to meet voluntarily
their civil rights obligations. This result would clearly be at odds with this Court's
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Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, dissented and
would have upheld the plan under either intermediate or strict scrutiny
because they asserted a public employer should be allowed to preserve
the benefits of a legitimate and constitutional hiring plan.' 8 ' In a sepa-
rate dissent, Justice Stevens also found the program constitutional be-
cause he concluded the school had a legitimate interest in employing
more African-American teachers in the future. 1
82
In summary, a majority of the Supreme Court had never established
a standard of review for affirmative action programs or benign racial
classifications prior to the decision in City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co.
("Croson "). 183 In Bakke, four members of the Court subjected the pro-
gram at issue to intermediate scrutiny, and one member subjected the
program to strict scrutiny.'84 In Wygant, four justices held the chal-
lenged program unconstitutional by subjecting the race-based classifica-
tion to strict scrutiny, while three members voted to uphold the program
under either intermediate or strict scrutiny.' In Fulliove, the only ma-
jor decision that upheld an affirmative action program, the six-member
majority did not establish a standard of review.' 86 Finally in 1989, a
majority of the Court agreed on a standard of review for programs based
on race.' 87 The Supreme Court in Croson appeared to establish a strict
scrutiny standard of review for all race-based classifications, even those
that benefited minorities.
188
In Croson, the Court invalidated Richmond's Minority Business
and Congress' consistent emphasis on the value of voluntary efforts to further the
objectives of the law.
Wygant 476 U.S. at 290 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (em-
phasis in original) (citations and quotations omitted).
181. Id. at 303 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 313 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
183. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
184. Justices Brennan, Marshall, White, and Blackmun would have upheld the program
under intermediate scrutiny. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 362 (Brennan, J., joined by White, Marshall,
and Blackmun, JJ.). In contrast, Justice Powell struck down the program under strict scru-
tiny. Id. at 315-20 (Powell, J.).
185. Justice Powell, joined by three other justices in his plurality opinion, subjected the
program to strict scrutiny and invalidated the program. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277-78 (Powell,
J., joined by Burger, C.J., Rehnquist and O'Connor, JJ.). While Justices Marshall, Brennan
and Blackmun would have upheld the plan under either intermediate or strict scrutiny. Id. at
303 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
186. JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 678 (2d ed. 1983).
187. The Court applied strict scrutiny to ensure "the means chosen 'fit' this compelling goal
so closely that there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was illegiti-
mate racial prejudice or stereotype." Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehn-
quist, C.J., White and Kennedy, JJ.). See Robert E. Suggs, Racial Discrimination in Business
Transactions, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1257, 1257 (1991).
188. "[T]he standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause is not dependent on the
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Utilization Plan,' 9 which required prime contractors who were awarded
city construction employment to subcontract at least thirty percent of
each dollar amount to minority business enterprises."9° Although Rich-
mond's plan was patterned after the exact plan upheld in Fullilove, 9' the
majority'92 found this plan unconstitutional.193 The Court invoked the
strict scrutiny standard of review, requiring the government to demon-
strate that the race-conscious program was "narrowly tailored" to
achieve a "compelling interest."' 94 The majority concluded that Rich-
mond had failed to demonstrate a compelling interest because it did not
show that Richmond had engaged in any past, specific, identifiable
discrimination.' 95
The dissenters of the Court advocated intermediate scrutiny for all
race of those burdened or benefited by a particular classification." Croson, 488 U.S. at 494
(O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White and Kennedy, JJ.).
189. Id. at 505 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White, Stevens, Scalia, and Ken-
nedy, JJ.).
190. The plan defined a minority business enterprise as "[a] business at least fifty-one (51)
percent of which is owned and controlled... by minority group members." Minorities were
defined as United States citizens "who are Blacks, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Es-
kimos, or Aleuts." Id at 478 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White, Stevens, Scalia
and Kennedy, JJ.) (quoting RICHMOND, VA., CODE § 12-23 (1985)).
191. See supra notes 160-67 and accompanying text.
192. Justice O'Connor wrote a six-part opinion in Croson. A majority of the Court agreed
to parts I, III-B, and IV. The majority comprised Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices O'Connor,
Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, and White. Part II of Justice O'Connor's opinion was joined only by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White. Parts III-A and V were joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices White and Kennedy.
193. "[A] generalized assertion that there has been past discrimination in an entire industry
provides no guidance for a legislative body to determine the precise scope of the injury it seeks
to remedy." Croson, 488 U.S. at 498 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White, Stevens,
Scalia and Kennedy, JJ.).
194. Id. at 505-07 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White, Stevens, Scalia and
Kennedy, JJ.).
195. Id. at 505. The Court reached this conclusion even though abundant evidence was
produced, including a study revealing that "while the general population of Richmond was
50% [fifty percent] black, only 0.67% [less than one percent] of the city's prime construction
contracts had been awarded to minority businesses in the 5-year period from 1978 to 1983."
Id. at 479-80. Nonetheless, the Court held that "[t]here was no direct evidence of race dis-
crimination on the part of the city in letting contracts or any evidence that the city's prime
contractors had discriminated against minority-owned subcontractors." Id. at 480.
Additionally, Richmond used congressional findings of discrimination in the construction
industry nationwide, similar to the type of evidence relied on by the Court in Fullilove. Id. at
504 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White, Stevens, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ). In this
case, however, the Court considered the findings irrelevant because it required particular find-
ings of racial discrimination in Richmond's own construction industry. See David P. Stoel-
ting, Note, Minority Business Set-Asides Must be Supported by Specific Evidence of Prior
Discrimination: City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 58 CIN. L. REV. 1097, 1112-13 (1990).
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benign classifications196 and would have upheld the plan as indistinguish-
able from the one in Fullilove. 197 As the case was decided by a six-to-
three vote, Croson thus marked the first time a majority agreed on a stan-
dard of review for racially based programs.' 98 Therefore, after Croson, it
appeared that only those programs that could withstand strict scrutiny
would be upheld.' 99 The Metro Broadcasting Court, however, ignored
this precedent and applied intermediate scrutiny to the minority prefer-
ence programs at issue.2°"
B. The Differences Between Croson and Metro Broadcasting Do Not
Mandate Disparate Treatment
The Supreme Court in Metro Broadcasting held that "benign race-
conscious measures mandated by Congress" are subject only to interme-
diate scrutiny.2 ' One year earlier in Croson, however, the same Court
had invoked strict scrutiny for a similar program.20 2 The two opinions
clearly contradict each other. Croson requires the application of strict
scrutiny to all race-based programs enacted by state governments, 0 3
while Metro Broadcasting allows intermediate scrutiny to be applied to
benign congressionally mandated preference programs.2' In subjecting
the policies in Metro Broadcasting to a lower standard of review, the
Court emphasized that the two programs at issue were benign affirmative
action programs.20 5 The Court in Croson, however, held that "the stan-
196. Croson, 488 U.S. at 535 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the plan
was voluntarily enacted by the city of Richmond to benefit its minority population and noted
that strict scrutiny had historically been reserved for only those cases involving invidious dis-
crimination. Id at 551-53.
Justice O'Connor replied that "there is simply no way of determining what classifications
are 'benign' or 'remedial' and what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions
of racial inferiority or simple racial politics." Id. at 493 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist,
C.J., White and Kennedy, JJ.). "Strict scrutiny of affirmative action plans in the future could
result in their being upheld when they are designed to achieve diversity. But scrutiny that has
been strict in name has most often been fatal in fact." Stephanie M. Wildman, Integration in
the 1980s: The Dream of Diversity and the Cycle of Exclusion, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1625, 1657
(1990).
197. Croson, 488 U.S. at 528 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
198. Jennifer M. Bott, Note, From Bakke to Croson: The Affirmative Action Quagmire and
the D.C. Circuit's Approach to FCC Minority Preference Policies, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 845,
853 n.59 (1990).
199. 488 U.S. at 494 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White and Kennedy, JJ.).
200. 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3008-09 (1990).
201. Id.
202. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (O'Connor, J., joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., White and Kennedy, JJ.) (1989).
203. 488 U.S. at 493-508.
204. 110 S. Ct. at 3008-09.
205. Id. at 3008.
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dard of review under the Equal Protection Clause is not dependent on
the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular classification." 2"
The differences between the affirmative action programs at issue
must be analyzed in order to reconcile the two opinions. The two main
distinctions are: (1) the program at issue in Croson was enacted by a
state, 20 7 rather than federally mandated;208 and (2) Croson involved a set-
aside, or quota,2 °9 rather than a preference scheme.2 I0 In contrast, Metro
Broadcasting involved congressionally mandated preference policies.2 1
The Court in Metro Broadcasting placed great emphasis on these distinc-
tions; however, the differences between the two programs are insignifi-
cant and do not mandate disparate treatment. While differences exist
between the program invalidated in Croson and the programs upheld in
Metro Broadcasting, these distinctions do not merit different levels of
constitutional scrutiny.
1. The Distinction Between State and Federal Government
In Metro Broadcasting, the Court relied heavily on the fact that
Congress had mandated the FCC minority preference policies.21 2 The
206. Id
207. Croson, 488 U.S. at 477.
208. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3008.
209. Croson, 488 U.S. at 477-78.
210. Although both quotas and goals are temporary measures, a quota is seen as an absolute
standard, while a goal is considered less mechanical. Roy L. Brooks, The Affirmative Action
Issue: Law, Policy, and Morality, 22 CONN. L. REV. 323, 335 (1990).
A quota is defined as a program that sets aside a certain number of places for minority
candidates. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE 309 (1985). An example of a
quota type program is the program invalidated in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 408-21 (1978), which set aside sixteen places out of one hundred for minority stu-
dents applying to the University of California at Davis medical school. Other examples in-
clude the programs at issue in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) and
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). See supra notes 153-194 and accompanying text.
In contrast, a preference program is "a consideration of minority status as but one factor
in a competitive multi-factor selection system that is designed to obtain a diverse mix." Winter
Park Communications, Inc. v. F.C.C., 873 F.2d 347, 353 (D.C. Cir. 1989), aff'd sub nom.
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990) (emphasis in original).
211. 110 S. Ct. at 3008.
212. Id. There is an argument that Congress did not actually mandate the policies. Justice
O'Connor argued in her dissent that the policies in Metro Broadcasting did not implicate Con-
gress' special powers under section five because that section only empowers Congress to act
respecting the states and this case concerned the administration of federal programs by federal
officials. Id. at 3030 (O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia and Kennedy,
JJ.). Additionally, one could argue that Congress did not actually mandate the programs at
issue because they only acted through an appropriations legislation. Notice of Inquiry on
Racial, Ethnic or Gender Classifications, 1 F.C.C.R. 1315 (1986). The appropriations riders
merely prevent the FCC from reexamining its preference programs; if Congress ever declined
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Court stated that "when a program employing a benign racial classifica-
tion is adopted by an administrative agency at the explicit direction of
Congress," the Court must defer to Congress.213 Congress has the power
to "provide for the . . . general welfare of the United States" and "to
enforce, by appropriate legislation," the Equal Protection Clause.2 4 The
Court added that such deference was appropriate due to "Congress' pow-
ers under the Commerce Clause, the Spending Clause, and the Civil War
Amendments."21 5 In contrast, the set-aside program in Croson was not
mandated by any federal law or court, but instead had been voluntarily
adopted by the elected legislature of Richmond to redress long-standing
inequality. 2 6 The Croson plan was struck down under strict scrutiny,
217
while the Metro Broadcasting programs were upheld under intermediate
218scrutiny.
The strict scrutiny standard adopted by the majority in Croson is
extremely difficult to meet. In order for an affirmative action plan to be
upheld, the state or local government must prove specific, identifiable
discrimination in its own community.21 9 State and local governments are
seriously deterred from enacting benign programs because to do so they
must, in essence, admit to having been discriminatory in the past. Re-
quiring states to provide documentation of identified discrimination dis-
courages the enactment of affirmative action programs.220 In sum, if
state legislatures are required to undergo strict scrutinization whenever
they enact an affirmative action program, it is likely the implementation
of these programs will be discontinued.
Because Metro Broadcasting did not overrule Croson,2 2 1 the
to renew the rider, the FCC could rescind its policies. Neal Devins, Metro Broadcasting, Inc.
v. FCC: Requiem for a Heavyweight, 69 TEX. L. REV. 125, 140 (1990).
213. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3008 (1990).
214. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
215. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3008 (citing Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,
473-78 (1980) (Burger, C.J.)).
216. Alan Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: The View From 1989, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1407,
1441 (1990).
217. 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989) (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White and Ken-
nedy, JJ.).
218. 110 S. Ct. at 3008-09.
219. Croson, 488 U.S. at 498-505 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White, Stevens,
Scalia and Kennedy, JJ.).
220. Margaret E. Deane, Note, City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.: A Federal Legislative
Answer, 100 YALE L.J. 451, 455 (1990).
221. Note that Representative John Conyers, Jr., who is Chairman of the House Govern-
ment Operations Committee, has held hearings on a bill to overturn the Croson decision by an
act of Congress. Neil A. Lewis, Court Ruling Encourages Affirmative Action, N.Y. TIMES, July
4, 1990, § 1, at 12.
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Supreme Court will continue to overturn state programs if they do not
satisfy the strict evidentiary burden placed upon them.222 In contrast, if
Congress enacts an identical program, the affirmative action program
will most likely be upheld under intermediate scrutiny. Metro Broadcast-
ing has thus created an unstable constitutional regime, where programs
will be found illegitimate if enacted by a state, but constitutionally per-
missible if legislated by Congress. This disparity is unjustified because
federal and state affirmative action plans should be subjected to the same
standard of constitutional review.
a. Programs Enacted by State Governments Should Be Subject to the
Same Standard of Review as Federal Governments
Although the Equal Protection Clause by its terms applies only to
states, it is well settled that equal protection analysis is the same under
both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.223 In Bolling v. Sharpe, the
Court held that the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment
prohibited the federal government from maintaining racially segregated
schools. 224 The Court stated that "it would be unthinkable that the same
Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government.
225
The Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed that "the reach of the
equal protection guarantee of the fifth amendment is coextensive with
that of the fourteenth [amendment]., 226 Accordingly, state and federally
imposed racial classifications should be subjected to the same level of
scrutiny.
Congress has special power under section five of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and thus, arguably, could be held to a lower standard of
equal protection review.227 The Court in Croson distinguished Fullilove,
222. Croson, 488 U.S. at 498-505 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White, Stevens,
Scalia and Kennedy, JJ.).
223. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 12, Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990) (No. 89-453).
224. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
225. Id. at 500.
226. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166 n.16 (1987) (plurality opinion).
227. Section five of the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress the power "to enforce, by
appropriate legislation" the provisions of that amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
The Court in Croson held that Congress has "unique remedial powers... under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment." 488 U.S. at 488 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.,
White, Stevens, Scalia and Kennedy, JJ.).
Other reasons to give greater deference to Congress have been evinced. Congress repre-
sents the entire nation, while state and local legislatures draw their representatives from a
small group. See 488 U.S. at 523 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting THE FEDERAL-
iST, No. 10 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961)). Second, Congress has more re-
sources than local governments to gain greater information regarding minority disparities.
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which upheld a minority set-aside program, based on this special power
of Congress.228 The Croson Court stated "that Congress may identify
and redress the effects of society-wide discrimination [but this] does not
mean that ... States and their political subdivisions are free to decide
that such remedies are appropriate.
229
In effect, the Croson Court declared that states do not have the
power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
Clause.230  This reasoning appears invalid because "the Fourteenth
Amendment was never intended to destroy the States' power to govern
themselves."1231  Nothing in Fullilove implies that the equal protection
guarantee can mean one thing for Congress and another for all other
levels of government.232 Fullilove alluded to section five only to validate
Congress' findings regarding the record of past discrimination.233 The
Fourteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to "enforce" the limited
prohibitions of the Civil War Amendments, 234 but Congress is still held
to the limits of the Constitution.
2 35
States have legislative power under the Equal Protection Clause, be-
cause the Constitution does not delegate exclusive authority to enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment to Congress. 236 The Fullilove Court relied
Nina Farber, Comment, Justifying Affirmative Action After City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson:
The Court Needs a Standard for Proving Past Discrimination, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 975, 1000
(1990). A counterargument is that state and local governments are more closely involved with
their respective communities and can better determine what policies should be implemented.
228. Croson, 488 U.S. at 504-05 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White, Stevens,
Scalia and Kennedy, JJ.).
229. Id at 490.
230. Stephanie M. Wildman, Integration in the 1980ss" The Dream of Diversity and the Cycle
of Exclusion. 64 TUL. L. REV. 1625, 1657 (1990).
231. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 126.
232. Charles Fried, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Two Concepts of Equality, 104
HARV. L. REV. 107, 117 (1990).
233. Id. at 115.
234. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 126 (1970). The Civil War Amendments comprise
the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments enacted by the Reconstruction Con-
gress after the Civil War ended. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
445-47 (1986).
235. "Congress' power under § 5 is limited to adopting measures to enforce the guarantees
of the Amendment; § 5 grants Congress no power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute these guaran-
tees." Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966).
236. "[I]t cannot be successfully argued that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to
strip the states of their power.., to govern themselves." Id. at 127.
The existence of a congressional power does not usually imply the nonexistence of a state
power. An exception to this general rule is Congress' power under the Commerce Clause to
"regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several states." U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 3. The Commerce Clause has been interpreted to be an implied limit on a state's power
to regulate commerce. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662
(1981) (holding statute banning the use of certain large trucks was invalid because it unconsti-
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on past precedent that stated "the power granted to Congress was not
intended to strip the States of their power to govern themselves or to
convert our national government into a central government of unre-
strained authority." 23" As the federal government is a government of
enumerated powers, it cannot have more power than state governments,
which are subject only to restrictions in the Constitution.23 s If Congress
alone held the power to enforce the Equal Protection Clause, it "would,
under the guise of insuring equal protection, blot out all state power,
leaving the 50 [fifty] states as little more than impotent figureheads.
' 239
Thus, neither the structural guarantees of the Constitution nor section
five of the Fourteenth Amendment can justify a different standard of re-
view for Congress. Therefore, both the federal and state governments
should be subject to the same standard of review.
b. States Should Have Full Power to Enact Programs Under the
Fourteenth Amendment
Federalism distributes governmental authority between state and
federal governments.2"° In certain areas, states have full police power
and the federal government has limited power to interfere. 24 ' Rationales
tutionally burdened interstate commerce); Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429
(1978) (invalidating Wisconsin regulations, which generally barred from its highways trucks
longer than 55 feet); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959) (invalidating
Illinois law requiring trucks to use curved mudflaps because statute unconstitutionally bur-
dened interstate commerce); Southern Pacific Co. v. Ariz., 325 U.S. 761 (1944) (striking down
state statute that regulated train lengths, as it contravened the Commerce Clause). See also
GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 232 (11th ed. 1985); LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-2, at 403 (2d ed. 1988).
Although this approach has never been used in the affirmative action area, if the Court
limits state power under the Equal Protection Clause, it will be analogous to the Dormant
Commerce Clause case law. If the Court denies states the right to enact their own affirmative
action programs, it will in effect create a totally novel constitutional doctrine, which might be
called the "Dormant Equal Protection Clause." Such a creation would have no roots in either
precedent or constitutional theory. This analogy was introduced by Professor Lawrence B.
Solum, Professor of Law at Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.
The rationale behind the Dormant Commerce Clause was to prohibit states from en-
croaching on other states' rights and to prevent states from impairing interstate commerce.
GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 249 (1986). This rationale is not pres-
ent in the equal protection area because state affirmative action plans do not pose a threat to
national unity.
237. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 128 (1970). See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S.
641, 651 n.10 (1966); Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 476-78 (discussing Mitchell and Katzenbach).
238. Mark Tushnet, Justice Brennan, Equality, and Majority Rule, 139 U. PA. L. REV.
1357, 1359 (1991).
239. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 126.
240. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 122 (1986).
241. Id. at 125.
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for federalism include efficiency, encouraging experimentation, promot-
ing individual choice, and advancing democracy.242 These theories sup-
port the idea that states should be given the same power to enforce the
Equal Protection Clause as that given to the federal government.
Justices O'Connor and Scalia argued in Croson that Congress has
special representation reinforcement powers.24 3 An argument can be
made that Congress, unlike state and local governments, is a national
representative body, and can best represent the interests of all the
states.2 " In contrast, however, state and local governments are more
closely involved with their respective communities than is Congress, and
therefore can better determine what policies should be implemented.
Giving states the power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment promotes
efficiency because of the wide variance in circumstances across the coun-
try.245 State and local governments also provide an opportunity for peo-
ple to participate directly in the activities of the government.246 Thus,
state governments should have equal power to enact affirmative action
programs.
2. The Distinction Between the Quota/Set-Aside
and the Preference/Plus
The second distinguishing characteristic between the Croson and
Metro Broadcasting affirmative action programs involves the difference
between quotas and preferences. The program in Croson involved a set-
aside quota,24 7 whereas the programs in Metro Broadcasting were consid-
ered preferences. 248 This distinction appears to be an influential factor in
determining the validity of race-conscious programs.249 In Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke ("Bakke"), 250 the Court distinguished
the comparative preference used by Harvard University and the set-aside
plan at issue used by the University of California at Davis ("U.C. Da-
vis"). 25 ' Justice Powell found the U.C. Davis plan, which set aside six-
242. Id. at 122-24.
243. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 486-93 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White, Ste-
vens, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ.), 526-28 (Scalia, J., concurring).
244. See generally THE FEDERALIST, No. 10, at 77 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.
1961).
245. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 123 (1986).
246. Id at 124.
247. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 477-78 (1989).
248. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3009 (1990).
249. Jesse H. Choper, Continued Uncertainty as to the Constitutionality of Remedial Racial
Classifications: Identifying the Pieces of the Puzzle, 72 IOWA L. REV. 255, 255 (1987).
250. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
251. Id. at 317 (Powell, J.). "[R]ace or ethnic background may be deemed a 'plus' in a
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teen out of one hundred places for minority students,2" 2 too restrictive
because it denied applicants the right to individual consideration without
regard to race.253 Powell concluded that quotas were "facially inva-
lid;" 9 4 although he was the only Justice who held this, his influence ap-
pears in subsequent cases. 255 The program invalidated in Croson
256
involved a set-aside quota, like the program struck down in Bakke.
2 S7
The fact that the Supreme Court appears more willing to allow racial
classifications, where the program does not involve a quota, illustrates
that a distinction may exist between quotas and preferences in Supreme
Court jurisprudence.
Actual differences exist between quota programs, which reserve
places for minorities, and preference plans, which consider race as only
one factor.25 s These differences, however, are merely symbolic and ad-
ministrative259 and do not mandate different standards of review. Sym-
bolically, preferences are better because they judge the minority
candidate on an overall basis, rather than solely on race.260 The flexible
preference system is also more efficient administratively. 26 These differ-
ences, however, cannot justify a constitutional distinction between the
two types of programs.262 As one commentator has argued, "[t]here
should be no constitutional distinction unless a quota program violates or
threatens the constitutional rights of white applicants as individuals in
some way that the more flexible programs do not.",
263
The FCC comparative preference policy upheld in Metro Broadcast-
ing is similar to the Harvard scheme approved in Bakke, because in both
instances, minority status was only one of several factors reviewed."4 It
particular applicant's file, yet it does not insulate the individual from comparison with all other
candidates." Id
252. Id at 279.
253. Id. at 318 n.52.
254. Id. at 307.
255. Jennifer M. Bott, Note, From Bakke to Croson: The Affirmative Action Quagmire and
the D.C. Circuit's Approach to FCC Minority Preference Policies, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 845,
869 (1990).
256. Croson, 488 U.S. at 477-78.
257. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 408 (Stevens, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Stewart and Rehnquist,
JJ.).
258. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATrIER OF PRINCIPLE 309 (1985).
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE 310 (1985) (emphasis in original).
264. Brief Amicus Curiae of The National Bar Association in Support of Respondent at 21-
22, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990) (No. 89-453).
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can be argued, however, that the distress sale program is more similar to
a quota program.2 65  In fact, the differences between the two minority
preference policies at issue in Metro Broadcasting were dispositive in the
lower court decisions.2 66 First, in the appellate decision of Winter Park
Communications v. FC.C., the comparative preference policy was upheld
because it did "not involve any quotas or fixed targets whatsoever, and
minority ownership [was] simply one factor among several." '267 The
court relied on the opinion in West Michigan Broadcasting Co. v. F C C.,
which also noted that the minority preference in comparative hearings is
"but one factor in a competitive multi-factor selection system. '2 61 Con-
versely, in the appellate decision of Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford,
Inc. v. F C. C, the court found the distress sale policy unconstitutional
because "the policy singles out one aspect of diversity and elevates it to
determinative status."269 At the lower court level, the flexibility of the
comparative license procedure led to its affirmation; in contrast, the ri-
gidity of the distress sale policy resulted in its reversal.27 °
The Supreme Court in Metro Broadcasting did not distinguish be-
tween the two policies, but treated them together as part of a combined
effort to increase minority ownership. 27' The Court concluded the dis-
tress sale program was not a set-aside, because non-minorities could con-
trol whether a distress sale occurred and the policy applied "only with
respect to a small fraction of broadcast licenses., 272 Whereas the Croson
Court invalidated a quota program that set aside a certain number of
places for minorities, the Metro Broadcasting Court upheld both of the
minority preference programs.27a The differences between the two types
of programs are insignificant and do not justify a different constitutional
265. "[The distress sale policy imposes a strict set-aside for the exclusive benefit of minor-
ity-owned broadcast stations." Michel Rosenfeld, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Affirma-
tive Action at the Crossroads of Constitutional Liberty and Equality, 38 UCLA L. REv. 583,
594 (1991).
266. Neal Devins, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Requiem for a Heavyweight, 69 TEX.
L. REv. 125, 131 (1990).
267. 873 F.2d 347, 354 (D.C. Cir. 1989), aff'd sub nom. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C.,
110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990).
268. West Michigan Broadcasting, Co. v. F.C.C., 735 F.2d 601, 613 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (em-
phasis in original).
269. Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford, Inc. v. F.C.C., 876 F.2d 902, 924 (D.C. Cir. 1989),
rev'd sub nom. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990).
270. Jennifer M. Bott, Note, From Bakke to Croson: The Affirmative Action Quagmire and
the D.C. Circuit's Approach to FCC Minority Preference Policies, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 845,
871 (1990).
271. Neal Devins, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Requiem for a Heavyweight, 69 TEX.
L. REv. 125, 131 (1990).
272. Metro Broadcasting 110 S. Ct. at 3026-27.
273. Id at 3009.
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standard.274
3. The Benign Classification
The Supreme Court failed not only to reconcile the disparate treat-
ment between Croson and Metro Broadcasting, but also failed to articu-
late a standard for defining a benign affirmative action program. In order
to protect the future of affirmative action programs, the Court in Metro
Broadcasting should have developed a standard for ascertaining whether
a race-based program is a benign classification. The Court's failure to
delineate such a standard increases the confusion courts and govern-
ments face in reviewing and developing affirmative action programs. The
case law appears to have developed another unintelligible standard, like
the one so often quoted in the obscenity area-"I know it when I see
it."' 275 If this is the test for determining whether a program is benign, it
is likely the Supreme Court will rarely "see it," especially with Justices
Brennan and Marshall retired from the Court.
For example, it is not clear from the Supreme Court's opinion why
the Metro Broadcasting programs were considered benign, while the
Croson plan was not. The Croson Court only stated that the mere asser-
tion of benign purpose was entitled to no weight.276 Additionally, Justice
O'Connor stated that there was no way to determine whether classifica-
tions were benign or motivated by "illegitimate notions of racial inferi-
ority. '2 77 In Bakke, however, Justices Brennan, Blackmun, Marshall,
and White advocated a test for determining whether a program should be
subject to intermediate or strict scrutiny.2 7' The Metro Broadcasting
Court could have adopted the Bakke four-factor test to determine which
standard of review would apply to a challenged program.
Intermediate scrutiny, rather than strict scrutiny, should be applied
to a race-based classification if the following criteria are met. First, the
governmental statute cannot restrict a fundamental right.2 79 Second, the
disadvantaged class must not have any of the "traditional indicia of sus-
pectness: the class is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to
such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a
position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protec-
274. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE 309 (1985).
275. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
276. Croson, 488 U.S. at 500 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Stevens, White,
Scalia and Kennedy, JJ.).
277. Id. at 493 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White and Kennedy, JJ.).
278. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357-76 (1978) (Brennan, White,
Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
279. Id at 357.
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tion from the majoritarian political process."280 Next, the racial classifi-
cation must be relevant to the goal sought. 8' Finally, the classification
cannot be based on a presumption of racial inferiority, nor promote ha-
tred.282 If these four factors are met, the classification would be consid-
ered benign and therefore subject to only intermediate scrutiny.
Although the above test leaves unanswered some questions of interpreta-
tion, it would certainly provide a clearer test than does the equivocal test
currently used.
If the Court had applied the above test in Metro Broadcasting, it
would have correctly applied intermediate scrutiny. The minority prefer-
ence policies would have been subject to the lower standard because: (1)
obtaining a broadcast license is not a fundamental right; (2) the program
disadvantages white males, who do not have the traditional indicia of
suspectness because they have not been subjected to a history of pur-
poseful unequal treatment;283 (3) the racial classifications are relevant to
obtaining program diversity;28 4 and (4) the classification is not based on a
presumption of racial inferiority.285 If the Court had applied these four
factors to the program at issue in Croson, it appears the program would
also have been considered benign and the Court should have applied in-
termediate scrutiny, rather than strict scrutiny.
280. Id. (quoting United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)).
281. Id. at 357. See Hirabayashi v. U.S., 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943), reh'g granted, 627 F.
Supp. 1445 (Wash. 1986), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987).
282. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-22, at 1530-31 (2d ed.
1988).
283. A key aspect of the requirement of strict scrutiny under the Carolene Products'
theory was the existence of a discrete insular minority unable to protect itself in the
political process. Given its underpinning and values, Carolene Products' standards
did not justify the imposition of strict scrutiny when whites claimed racial discrimi-
nation or equal protection violations.
Linda S. Greene, Race in the 21st Century: Equality Through Law?, 64 TUL. L. REv. 1515,
1532 (1990).
In Bakke, Justices Brennan, Blackmun, Marshall and White realized that such protection
may be needed by white ethnic minorities; however, because the program did not on its face
discriminate against any such group, they had no constitutional claim unless they could show
discriminatory intent under Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). See Bakke, 438 U.S. at
358 n.35 (Brennan, J., joined by White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.).
"Because the Court in Davis [Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)] held that a
policy did not trigger equal protection strict scrutiny even though it had a disproportionately
adverse impact on blacks as a group, it would be ironic indeed if mere adverse impact on a
white subgroup were enough to invalidate an affirmative action plan, or even to trigger strict
scrutiny." LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-22, at 1530 n.39
(2d ed. 1988) (emphasis in original).
284. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3010 (1990).
285. "The judgment that there is a link between expanded minority ownership and broad-
cast diversity does not rest on impermissible stereotyping." Id. at 3016.
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In Croson, however, Justice O'Connor concluded that even if differ-
ent levels of scrutiny applied to different groups, strict scrutiny would
still apply to the program at issue28 6 because of the racial composition of
Richmond's City Council.2"7 In noting that African-Americans com-
prised five of nine seats on the City Council,28 8 Justice O'Connor ap-
peared to be inferring the existence of discrimination.28 9 She expressed a
"concern that a political majority will more easily act to the disadvantage
of a minority. ' ' 2 ° Justice O'Connor stressed that unless the body enact-
ing a racial preference has identified past discrimination, the measure
may be a product of "unthinking stereotypes" or "racial politics."291
The application of a higher standard of scrutiny when minorities
have become majorities dooms affirmative action measures and puts cit-
ies with minority leaders at a disadvantage.292 This approach ensures
that almost all affirmative action programs enacted under minority lead-
ership will be invalidated because they must withstand strict scrutiny, the
most stringent judicial evaluation.293 If the Court is seriously concerned
that minority leaders will enact affirmative action programs to purposely
disadvantage the majority, this could be an additional factor considered
in determining whether a program is benign. The additional criteria
would still be better than no standard at all.
286. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495 (1989) (O'Connor, J., joined
by Rehnquist, C.J., White and Kennedy, JJ.).
287. David P. Stoelting, Note, Minority Business Set-Asides Must Be Supported by Specific
Evidence of Prior Discrimination: City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 58 U. CIN. L. REV.
1097, 1123 (1990).
288. Croson, 488 U.S. at 495 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White and Kennedy,
J.).
289. Stephanie M. Wildman, Integration in the 1980sv" The Dream of Diversity and the Cycle
of Exclusion, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1625, 1632 (1990).
290. Croson, 488 U.S. at 495-96 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White and Ken-
nedy, JJ.).
While one could dismiss O'Connor's point as a facile legal argument, one may well
take the statement as a warning to urban blacks who are gaining political power...
that if they try to serve their own constituencies in the same way that white political
majorities have always done in American cities, they will be hauled into court as
racists.
Alan Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: The View From 1989, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1407, 1432
(1990).
291. Croson, 488 U.S. at 510 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White and Kennedy,
JJ.).
292. Cassandra D. Hart, Unresolved Tensions The Croson Decision, 7 HARV. BLACK-
LETrER J. 71, 72 (1990).
293. Id at 84.
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C Intermediate Scrutiny Should Apply to All Programs
That Benefit Minorities
The Supreme Court correctly applied the intermediate scrutiny
standard in Metro Broadcasting. 2 94 Intermediate scrutiny requires the
program at issue to be substantially related to an important governmen-
tal objective.295 In contrast, strict scrutiny requires a compelling interest
to be necessary and narrowly tailored to the achievement of that inter-
est.296 While the comparison of the two standards may seem like a quib-
ble of words, in actuality it has far-reaching consequences. The test the
Supreme Court decides to apply will almost always decide the outcome
of the case.
All race-based classifications are subject to heightened scrutiny,
either intermediate or strict scrutiny.297 Under strict scrutiny, all pro-
grams will assuredly be invalidated.298 In contrast, if the courts apply
intermediate scrutiny to affirmative action programs, some plans may be
upheld. Therefore, intermediate scrutiny should apply to all race-based
classifications that benefit minorities, while strict scrutiny should still ap-
ply to those programs that hurt minorities. One commentator notes that
"there does not appear to be any good reason for the adoption of the
strict scrutiny standard for affirmative action programs. ' 299 While af-
firmative action is in a sense reverse discrimination, the motivation be-
hind the two forms is unmistakably different.3"o
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) defines
affirmative action as "actions 4ppropriate to overcome the effects of past
or present practices, policies or other barriers to equal employment op-
portunities."30 1 Affirmative action is intuitively fair because it cancels
out forms of discrimination, and increases the likelihood that women and
minorities will be treated equally. 02 Therefore, these affirmative action
programs should be upheld by the courts under intermediate scrutiny.
294. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357 (1978) (Brennan, J., joined by
White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.).
295. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3009 (1990).
296. JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 591-92 (2d ed. 1983).
297. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 496 (1986).
298. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-6, at 1451-52 (2d ed.
1988).
299. Roy L. Brooks, The Affirmative Action Issue: Law, Policy, and Morality, 22 CONN. L.
REV. 323, 350 (1990).
300. Id. at 353.
301. 29 C.F.R. § 1608.1(c) (1985).
302. Joel J. Kupperman, Relations Between the Sexes: Timely vs. Timeless Principles, 25
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1027, 1038 (1988).
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1. Strict in Scrutiny Means Fatal in Fact
One scholar has commented that "strict in scrutiny" means "fatal in
fact. ' 30 3 If strict scrutiny is applied to benign programs, then most, if
not all, programs will fail. The program must overcome an almost con-
clusive presumption of unconstitutionality.3° In the Supreme Court's
history, only one racially based program has withstood strict scrutiny.30 5
The Fourteenth Amendment's original purpose was to address hostile
legislation that imposed a stigma on the disadvantaged minority.3 1
Those who drafted the Equal Protection Clause intended to attack slav-
ery, but it is unlikely they intended to outlaw all racial classifications or
expected that such a prohibition would result.3°7 If strict scrutiny is ap-
plied to all race-based programs, even those that benefit minorities, the
courts will most assuredly invalidate all affirmative action programs. It
is "ironic that a measure [the Equal Protection Clause] enacted to pro-
tect a minority from adverse treatment could be used to bar programs
designed to remedy past discrimination.,
30 1
Under the first prong of strict scrutiny, the only interest that
Supreme Court decisions to date have found compelling is remedying
past discrimination. 3° Under Croson, this finding must be explicit.3 I°
The Croson Court found that the governmental interest of remedying
past discrimination was insufficient due to a lack of factual predicate.
3 1 1
The Court held that strict scrutiny requires the government to prove they
engaged in past, intentional discrimination.312
In Croson, the City of Richmond claimed that past discrimination
303. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Forward: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8
(1972).
304. Judith C. Areen et al., Scholars Reply to Professor Fried, 99 YALE L.J. 163, 166 (1989).
305. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-6, at 1451-52 (2d ed.
1988). In Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), the Supreme Court deferred to
military judgment and upheld a statute requiring internment of Japanese-Americans during
World War II. The case has since been severely criticized and would almost surely be held
unconstitutional today. Mary C. Daly, Affirmative Action, Equal Access and the Supreme
Court's 1988 Term: The Rehnquist Court Takes a Sharp Turn to the Right, 18 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1057, 1103-04 (1990).
306. GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 743 (1 1th ed. 1985).
307. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 226 (1978).
308. JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 664 (2d ed. 1983).
309. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3033-34 (1990) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
310. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498-99 (1990) (O'Connor, J.,
joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Stevens, White and Kennedy, JJ.).
311. Croson, 488 U.S. at 505 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White, Stevens,
Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ.).
312. Id.
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existed and proved it with the following: (1) a statistical study showing
that although Richmond's population was fifty percent African-Ameri-
can, less than one percent of its prime construction contracts had been
allotted to minority businesses; 313 (2) figures establishing that virtually
no minorities were members of local contractor associations; (3) a similar
plan had been upheld in Fullilove v. Klutznick,"3 4 and (4) the statements
of members of Richmond's City Council indicating widespread racial dis-
crimination in the construction industry. 3 5 The Court, however, ad-
dressed each of the findings that had formed the basis of the plan, and
declared them to be individually and collectively insufficient.316
Most programs will fail this standard if it is applied. Additionally,
governments will be deterred from enacting affirmative action programs
because they will not want to admit to intentional, past discrimination.
Thus, if strict scrutiny is applied to all race-based classifications, it is
likely no affirmative action programs will be upheld. In contrast, under
intermediate scrutiny the Metro Broadcasting Court did not require spe-
cific evidence of past discrimination and upheld the affirmative action
programs.31 7
2. Strict Scrutiny Should Not Be Applied to Benign Programs
Justice Marshall, in his dissent in Croson, disagreed vehemently with
the application of strict scrutiny to benign affirmative action programs:
In concluding that remedial classifications warrant no different
standard of review under the Constitution than the most brutal
313. The study showed that "while the general population of Richmond was 50% black,
only 0.67% [less than one percent] of the city's prime construction contracts had been
awarded to minority businesses." Id. at 479-80.
314. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
315. Croson, 488 U.S. at 498-506 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White, Stevens,
Scalia and Kennedy, JJ.); Margaret E. Deane, Note, City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co: A
Federal Legislative Answer, 100 YALE L.J. 451, 453 (1990).
The Croson majority dismissed these gross underrepresentations of people of color, of
blacks in particular, as potentially attributable to their lack of "desire" to be contrac-
tors. In other words, the nearly one hundred percent absence of a given population
from an extremely lucrative profession was explained away as mere lack of initiative.
Patricia J. Williams, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Regrouping in Singular Times, 104
HARV. L. REV. 525, 532-33 (1990).
"One need have only the dimmest idea of American history to have a sense of why Afri-
can-Americans were underrepresented in the construction industry in Richmond, Virginia.
Two hundred and fifty years of slavery were followed by four score years of legally enforced
subordination of blacks." T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousnes 91 COLUM.
L. REV. 1060, 1073 (1991).
316. Croson, 488 U.S. at 498-506 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Stevens, White,
Scalia and Kennedy, JJ.).
317. 110 S. Ct. at 3008-09.
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and repugnant forms of state-sponsored racism, a majority of
this Court signals that it regards racial discrimination as largely
a phenomenon of the past, and that government bodies need no
longer preoccupy themselves with rectifying racial injustice.3"'
The purpose of strict scrutiny is to "smoke out" illegitimate uses of dis-
crimination by assuring that the goal of the legislative body is important
enough to warrant using a highly suspect tool.319 Strict scrutiny also
ensures that the means are narrowly tailored, so that there is no possibil-
ity of illegitimate racially prejudicial motives.32 If courts subject all
race-based programs to strict scrutiny, then even benign programs must
pass the test applied in Croson. A benign program, however, usually
comes into existence when a majority voluntarily decides to disadvantage
themselves. Thus, an improper motive is impossible, and strict scrutiny
is unnecessary.
The two types of programs should not be treated the same, because
a significant difference exists between a classification framed to help those
who have suffered past discrimination and a racial classification that
causes further disadvantagement.32 I Additionally, requiring strict scru-
tiny for affirmative action programs is entirely unnecessary to safeguard
interests of non-minorities, who have enjoyed the benefits from centuries
of legal superiority.322 In sum, the intermediate scrutiny standard of re-
318. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 552 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing). In response to Justice Marshall, Justice O'Connor replied that "[t]he dissent's watered-
down version of equal protection review effectively assures that race will always be relevant in
American life, and that the 'ultimate goal' of 'eliminat[ing] entirely from governmental deci-
sionmaking such irrelevant factors as a human being's race' will never be achieved." Id at 495
(O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White and Kennedy, JJ.) (quoting Wygant v. Jack-
son Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267, 320 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
319. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White and Kennedy,
JJ.).
320. Id
321. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 309 (1985). "A profound difference
separates governmental actions that themselves are racist, and governmental actions that seek
to remedy the effects of prior racism ..... Croson, 488 U.S. at 551-52 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
322. Dianne E. Dixon, The Dismantling of Affirmative Action Programs: Evaluating City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 7 JOURNAL OF HUMAN RTS. 35, 52 (1990). In Croson, Justice
Marshall noted:
It cannot seriously be suggested that nonminorities in Richmond have any "history
of purposeful unequal treatment." Nor is there any indication that they have any of
the disabilities that have characteristically afflicted those groups this Court has
deemed suspect. Indeed, the numerical and political dominance of nonminorities
within the State of Virginia and the Nation as a whole provides an enormous political
check against the "simple racial politics" at the municipal level which the majority
fears.
488 U.S. at 553-54.
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
view is sufficient when a benign affirmative action program is at issue.
V. EFFECTS AND IMPLICATIONS OF METRO BROADCASTING
A. Classifications Based on Gender Can Pass Constitutional Scrutiny
More Easily Than Benign Racial Classifications
If strict scrutiny is imposed on benign affirmative action programs,
then the Equal Protection Clause becomes more generous toward affirm-
ative action programs for females than it is for those programs that bene-
fit minorities.323 This is ironic because the primary purpose of the Equal
Protection Clause was to benefit minorities. The "one prevailing pur-
pose" of the Fourteenth Amendment was "the freedom of the slave race,
the security and firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of
the newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who
had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him." '324 Since its en-
actment, however, the Fourteenth Amendment has benefited other inter-
ests unrelated to providing racial equality.325
Gender-based classifications are subject to heightened scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause.326 Women, however, are not consid-
ered a suspect class and therefore are not subject to strict scrutiny.32
The Court instead applies intermediate scrutiny to all gender-related
classifications. A gender-based plan must serve "important governmen-
tal objectives" and be "substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives." '328 The intermediate scrutiny test applies regardless of
whether the affirmative action program was enacted by a federal or state
government and whether the policy is a quota or preference.329
323. Roy L. Brooks, The Affirmative Action Issue: Law, Policy, and Morality, 22 CoNN. L.
REv. 323, 339 (1990).
324. The Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
325. Donald E. Lively & Stephen Plass, Equal Protection: The Jurisprudence of Denial and
Evasion, 40 AM. U.L. REV. 1307, 1310 (1991).
326. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723 (1982); Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71, 75 (1971).
327. Roy L. Brooks, The Affirmative Action Issue: Law, Policy, and Morality, 22 CoNN. L.
REv. 323, 347 (1990).
328. Mississippi Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 724 (quoting Wengler v. Druggists Mutual
Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980)).
329. See, e.g., Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980) (employing inter-
mediate scrutiny, the Court struck down a Missouri workers' compensation law that required
a widower, but not a widow, to prove dependence on the spouse in order to qualify for bene-
fits); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (excluding students from
women's school of nursing based solely on gender violated Equal Protection Clause); Orr v.
Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (striking down law allowing courts to order alimony payments only
to women); Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979) (holding that a provision of the federally
enacted Social Security Act violated the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment,
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As the law currently stands, courts apply intermediate scrutiny even
to those statutes challenged as a burden on males.330 It is interesting to
note that Chief Justice Rehnquist has dissented in many of these cases
because of the standard applied by the Court. Ironically, in contrast to
his opinions regarding minorities, the Chief Justice has consistently ad-
vocated a lower standard of scrutiny for males in gender discrimination
cases. 331 He argues that a lower standard of review is applicable because
men have suffered no history of discrimination or disadvantage, and are
therefore not "in need of the special solicitude of the courts. ' 332 Advo-
cating a lower standard for benign gender discrimination is analogous to
applying intermediate scrutiny to benign affirmative action; however,
Chief Justice Rehnquist has failed to draw this distinction and has advo-
cated strict scrutiny for all race-based classifications, including benign
affirmative action programs. 333 Thus, more gender-based programs will
withstand the Court's constitutional analysis under a lower standard
than that used to judge benign race classifications.3 34
Under current Supreme Court doctrine, affirmative action programs
that benefit females will be upheld more often than those benefiting Afri-
can-Americans, the intended beneficiaries of the Equal Protection
Clause. If courts implement an intermediate standard for all benign pro-
grams, then at least minorities and females will receive equal treatment.
It could be argued, however, that the adoption of intermediate scrutiny
for all benign race and gender classifications does not go far enough, be-
cause it only places females and minorities on equal grounds.335 Minori-
ties, especially African-Americans, deserve favored treatment because of
their past suffering and may be entitled to an even lower standard of
by providing benefits to the dependent children of unemployed fathers, but not those of unem-
ployed mothers); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (invalidating a Social Security
provision that paid survivor benefits to widowers only if they could show substantial reliance
on deceased's income); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (invalidating state statute prohibit-
ing the sale of beer to certain males under intermediate scrutiny); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,
420 U.S. 636 (1975) (invalidating Social Security benefits confined to widows because purpose
was not remedial).
330. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-27, at 1569 (2d ed.
1988).
331. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 218-
19 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
332. Michael M, 450 U.S. at 476.
333. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989) (O'Connor, J., joined
by Rehnquist, C.J., White and Kennedy, JJ.).
334. Roy L. Brooks, The Affirmative Action Issue: Law, Policy, and Morality, 22 CONN. L.
REv. 323, 350 (1990).
335. Id. at 351.
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336review.
B. The Supreme Court Is Eroding State Power
After Metro Broadcasting, the only affirmative action programs that
are likely to be upheld are those enacted by Congress. By ruling that
Congress has broader power than state legislatures to mandate affirma-
tive action, the Court has reinforced the complaint of state and local
officials that their constitutional authority is being eroded.337 By over-
turning laws enacted by state governments, the Court wrongly interferes
with the everyday management of local government affairs. The nega-
tive, practical consequences for state governments should not be
understated.338
The strict scrutiny test is very stringent and requires state govern-
ments to admit they engaged in past discrimination. 339 As a practical
matter, it subjects state-enacted affirmative action programs to pro-
tracted litigation so that state and local governments may prove they
were guilty of racist behavior.34  Requiring governments to admit guilt
for past discrimination significantly deters the implementation of volun-
tary affirmative action programs.341
Additionally, remedying past discrimination is the only compelling
interest to date that has withstood strict scrutiny.3 4 2 Aside from remedy-
ing past discrimination, governments or employers may have many other
reasons for enacting affirmative action programs. In Wygant, the school
board adopted an affirmative action plan to improve the quality of educa-
tion and provide role models for its students.34 3 In Bakke, it was to pro-
336. Roy L. Brooks, Affirmative Action in Law Teaching, 14 COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REV.
15, 42-45 (1982).
337. Linda P. Campbell, States Fear More Issues Becoming a Federal Case, CHI. TRIB., July
15, 1990, at C5.
338. Many state and local government plans that followed Congress' lead in expanding
minority access to government were subject to protracted litigation by the Croson decision.
Kathleen M. Sullivan, City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.: The Backlash Against Affirma-
tive Action, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1609, 1615 (1990).
339. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505 (O'Connor, J., joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., White, Stevens, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ.) (1989).
340. Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267, 278 n.5 (1986) (Powell, J.,
joined by Burger, C.J., Rehnquist and O'Connor, JJ.).
341. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases,
100 HARV. L. REV. 78, 92 (1986).
342. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3033-34 (1990) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
343. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 272 (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Rehnquist and O'Connor,
JJ.).
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mote diversity in education. 3" Employers may also have forward-
looking reasons for affirmative action: to improve their services to mi-
norities, avert racial tension, or increase the diversity of a work force.345
Voluntary affirmative action programs should be implemented in order
to attain a more racially-balanced and brighter future for minorities.3
The Court should allow these forward-looking justifications so that some
day racial classifications will no longer be needed.
VI. CONCLUSION
The distribution of wealth and power has been skewed by massive
and, until fairly recently, governmentally sanctioned racial discrimina-
tion targeted at minorities.347 This discrimination has severely limited
the opportunities of minorities to compete in society.34 Discrimination
has been prevalent in this country, and has denied many people basic
privileges, including an equal opportunity to live where they choose, to
attend schools, to obtain jobs, and to attain government benefits such as
construction contracts or broadcast licenses.349 Preferential treatment is
necessary to remedy the lingering effects and continued discriminatory
impact of racism.35  As Justice Blackmun stated, "In order to get be-
344. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-14 (1978) (Powell, J.).
345. See Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust! A Comment on the Affirmative Action
Debate, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1329 (1986).
346. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases,
100 HARv. L. REv. 78, 97 (1986).
347. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union, The New York City Com-
mission on Human Rights, and The NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund in Support of
Petitioner in No. 89-700 and in Support of Respondents in No. 89-453 at 7, Astroline Commu-
nications Company v. Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990) (No.
89-700); Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990) (No. 89-453).
348. Id
349. Cassandra D. Hart, Unresolved Tension" The Croson Decision, 7 HARV. BLACK-
LETrER J. 71, 95 (1990).
Justice Brennan points out in his plurality opinion in Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers'
Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC that because of a long history of discrimination,
affirmative race-conscious relief may be the only means available "to assure equality
of employment opportunities and to eliminate those discriminatory practices and de-
vices which have fostered racially stratified job environments to the disadvantage of
minority citizens." Affirmative action "promptly operates to change the outward
and visible signs of yesterday's racial distinctions and thus, to provide an impetus to
the process of dismantling the barriers, psychological or otherwise, erected by past
practices."
478 U.S. 421, 450 (1986) (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800
(1973), and NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614, 621 (5th Cir. 1974)) (citations omitted).
350. Margaret E. Deane, Note, City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.: A Federal Legislative
Answer, 100 YALE L.J. 451, 451 (1990). See also Judith C. Areen et al., Constitutional Schol-
ars'Statement on Affirmative Action After City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 98 YALE L.J.
1711 (1989).
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yond racism, we must first take account of race."' 351 Affirmative action
programs, however, should not be seen as a reinstatement of the ugly
exclusionary practices of the past;352 rather, they are a means of achiev-
ing equality for all.
353
We cannot promote the ideals of equality, fairness, and equal oppor-
tunity without implementing affirmative action plans.354 Unless Metro
Broadcasting is expanded, however, it is destined to have only a limited
effect on affirmative action jurisprudence.355 Because the Supreme Court
has failed to provide specific guidelines for assessing the constitutionality
of minority preference programs, a substantial likelihood exists that the
new Supreme Court will find many ways to limit this opinion.356 While
Metro Broadcasting provided a good result, its reasoning is likely to be
351. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (separate opinion of
Blackmun, J.). See also Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 239 (5th
Cir. 1977) (dissenting opinion), rev'd, United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979)
(writing that as long as "the pervasive effects of centuries of societal discrimination still haunt
us," reasonable efforts to undo them should be sustained).
352. Some Justices argue that benign programs are ineffective because prejudice is fostered
whenever racial distinctions exist, and preferential treatment reinforces the sense of inferiority
among minorities. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 224 (1978). For exam-
ple, Justice O'Connor stated in Metro Broadcasting:
The dangers of such classifications are clear. They endorse race-based reasoning and
the conception of a Nation divided into racial blocs, thus contributing to an escala-
tion of racial hostility and conflict. Such policies may embody stereotypes that treat
individuals as the product of their race, evaluating their thoughts and efforts - their
very worth as citizens - according to a criterion barred to the Government by his-
tory and the Constitution. Racial classifications, whether providing benefits to or
burdening particular racial or ethnic groups may stigmatize those groups singled out
for different treatment and may create considerable tension with the Nation's widely
shared commitment to evaluating individuals upon their individual merit.
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3029 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted). However, Justices should not be allowed to overrule decisions of other
officials because they disagree with the efficiency of social politics. RONALD DWORKIN, TAK-
ING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 224 (1978).
353. Cassandra D. Hart, Unresolved Tensions: The Croson Decision, 7 HARV. BLACK-
LETrER J. 71, 95 (1990).
For additional commentaries favoring affirmative action, see Randall Kennedy, Persua-
sion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1327
(1986); MyrI L. Duncan, The Future of Affirmative Action: A Jurisprudential/Legal Critique,
17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 503 (1982); John Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse
Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHi. L. REV. 723 (1974).
354. Stephanie M. Wildman, Integration in the 1980V The Dream of Diversity and the Cycle
of Exclusion, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1625, 1659 (1990).
355. "Justice Brennan's departure from the Court adds further uncertainty about doctrinal
developments in this area, including the longevity of Metro Broadcasting." T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1060, 1062 (1991).
356. The Court will continue to ignore precedent, find a narrow interpretation, or place a
greater procedural burden on plaintiffs, rather than overrule precedent. Mary C. Daly, Affirm-
ative Action, Equal Access and the Supreme Court's 1988 Term: The Rehnquist Court Takes a
Sharp Turn to the Right, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1057, 1069 (1990).
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problematic in the future, especially without Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall on the Supreme Court. In addition to failing to distinguish Croson,
the opinion lacks a test for determining whether a program is "benign."
Thus, the new Court may easily construct a narrow definition of benign
affirmative action programs. Additionally, any program enacted by a
state or local government will be required to withstand strict scrutiny
under Croson, and Metro Broadcasting will never come into play.
As the law stands now, any race-based program that is enacted by a
state or local government will be subject to strict scrutiny under
Croson3 and will certainly fail constitutionally. 38 The same is true for
all quota or set-aside programs under Croson and Bakke. Metro Broad-
casting allows only "benign congressionally mandated" minority prefer-
ences to be reviewed by intermediate scrutiny.35 9 If any of these factors
are missing, or if a question exists regarding whether the program is actu-
ally benign, the "strict in scrutiny... fatal in fact ''36 test will apply, and
the program will be found unconstitutional.
Unfortunately, the Metro Broadcasting decision does little to resolve
the conflicting mandates of the Equal Protection Clause. Affirmative ac-
tion is now in the hands of Congress. Before the new Supreme Court can
limit the effect of Metro Broadcasting, Congress should either pass legis-
lation authorizing states and local governments to implement affirmative
action programs or it should itself mandate new programs to protect
against the Supreme Court's continued erosion.361
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